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• 1. [Article] Conservation for Sale: A Dynamic Common Agency Model of Natural Resource Regulation

  This paper considers the regulation of a natural resource within a dynamic common agency framework. In setting harvest quotas, the regulator responds to lobbying pressure (contributions) from harvesters ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Conservation for Sale: A Dynamic Common Agency Model of Natural Resource Regulation Author: Boyce, John R. Year: 2001 This paper considers the regulation of a natural resource within a dynamic common agency framework. In setting harvest quotas, the regulator responds to lobbying pressure (contributions) from harvesters and conservationists. The truthful Markov perfect equilibrium stock is then an increasing function of the effective political weight for conservationists. Since the contributions to the regulator are independent of the no-regulation equilibrium, both individual and aggregate welfare may decline by adopting regulation. Indeed, harvesters operating under private property will always oppose regulation, and harvesters operating under common property will oppose regulation if their welfare is not valued highly enough by the regulator. Since conservationists’ gross welfare is always improved by regulation, and since the regulator cannot fully capture their rents, conservationists will support regulation. For regulation to be supported by harvesters and conservationists, it is more important that the welfare of harvesters be taken into account by the regulator. This is because harvesters, like conservationists, value the stock, but conservationists, unlike harvesters, place no value on the harvests. Title: Conservation for Sale: A Dynamic Common Agency Model of Natural Resource Regulation Author: Boyce, John R. Year: 2001 This paper considers the regulation of a natural resource within a dynamic common agency framework. In setting harvest quotas, the regulator responds to lobbying pressure (contributions) from harvesters and conservationists. The truthful Markov perfect equilibrium stock is then an increasing function of the effective political weight for conservationists. Since the contributions to the regulator are independent of the no-regulation equilibrium, both individual and aggregate welfare may decline by adopting regulation. Indeed, harvesters operating under private property will always oppose regulation, and harvesters operating under common property will oppose regulation if their welfare is not valued highly enough by the regulator. Since conservationists’ gross welfare is always improved by regulation, and since the regulator cannot fully capture their rents, conservationists will support regulation. For regulation to be supported by harvesters and conservationists, it is more important that the welfare of harvesters be taken into account by the regulator. This is because harvesters, like conservationists, value the stock, but conservationists, unlike harvesters, place no value on the harvests. Close

• 2. [Article] Marine Stewardship Council: Who should join and why?

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Marine Stewardship Council: Who should join and why? Author: Chadwick, Amanda Research Paper Title: Marine Stewardship Council: Who should join and why? Author: Chadwick, Amanda Research Paper Close

• 3. [Article] Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish

  Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish Author: Poole, Erik Year: 2001 Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort is regulated and effort caps appear to be binding, I argue that social choice of political lobbying effort becomes the principal choice variable by which commercial fishermen continue to press for additional fishing opportunities relative to the regulator’s desired catch target. The model helps explain recent fish stock collapses. The analysis also questions the appropriateness of continuing the fishing category of Canadian employment insurance as the regulator embraces a precautionary, risk averse approach to fisheries management. Title: Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish Author: Poole, Erik Year: 2001 Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort is regulated and effort caps appear to be binding, I argue that social choice of political lobbying effort becomes the principal choice variable by which commercial fishermen continue to press for additional fishing opportunities relative to the regulator’s desired catch target. The model helps explain recent fish stock collapses. The analysis also questions the appropriateness of continuing the fishing category of Canadian employment insurance as the regulator embraces a precautionary, risk averse approach to fisheries management. Close

• 4. [Article] Understanding Differences in Regulatory Effort Across Stocks: A Preliminary Analysis

  In an environment of limited resources and expanded management expectations, fisheries regulators face hard decisions about how intensively to regulate different stocks. The Fishery Management Councils ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Understanding Differences in Regulatory Effort Across Stocks: A Preliminary Analysis Author: Yandle, Tracy, Crosson, Scott, Melnychuk, Michael, Hilborn, Ray In an environment of limited resources and expanded management expectations, fisheries regulators face hard decisions about how intensively to regulate different stocks. The Fishery Management Councils are required to regulate harvest of all stocks in a sustainable manner, but have discretion on how much regulatory effort to invest in individual species or species complexes. What drives regulators to invest management resources in one species over another? Is this dynamic the same nation-wide or does it vary by region? These questions have implications for understanding regulatory decision-making and how management resources are prioritized. Regulatory activity for a stock is represented by the number of citations in the Federal Register (notices, proposed rules, and rules) over a recent 5-year period for each species in each management council region. Predictor variable data for the same stocks are from the FSA management attributes database consisting of current and historical management, biological, and economic characteristics of each fishery. Title: Understanding Differences in Regulatory Effort Across Stocks: A Preliminary Analysis Author: Yandle, Tracy, Crosson, Scott, Melnychuk, Michael, Hilborn, Ray In an environment of limited resources and expanded management expectations, fisheries regulators face hard decisions about how intensively to regulate different stocks. The Fishery Management Councils are required to regulate harvest of all stocks in a sustainable manner, but have discretion on how much regulatory effort to invest in individual species or species complexes. What drives regulators to invest management resources in one species over another? Is this dynamic the same nation-wide or does it vary by region? These questions have implications for understanding regulatory decision-making and how management resources are prioritized. Regulatory activity for a stock is represented by the number of citations in the Federal Register (notices, proposed rules, and rules) over a recent 5-year period for each species in each management council region. Predictor variable data for the same stocks are from the FSA management attributes database consisting of current and historical management, biological, and economic characteristics of each fishery. Close

• 5. [Article] Characteristics and Changes of Trawl Fishery Management Institution in the Great Barrier Reef, Australia

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Characteristics and Changes of Trawl Fishery Management Institution in the Great Barrier Reef, Australia Author: Hidaka, Takeshi Research Paper Title: Characteristics and Changes of Trawl Fishery Management Institution in the Great Barrier Reef, Australia Author: Hidaka, Takeshi Research Paper Close

• 6. [Article] Understanding Non-Compliance Behavior with U.S. Protected Species Regulations

  Abstract Only

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Understanding Non-Compliance Behavior with U.S. Protected Species Regulations Author: Das, Chhandita, Bisack, Kathryn Abstract Only Title: Understanding Non-Compliance Behavior with U.S. Protected Species Regulations Author: Das, Chhandita, Bisack, Kathryn Abstract Only Close

• 7. [Article] Over-capacity, Regulation and Rent: A Norwegian Case Study

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Over-capacity, Regulation and Rent: A Norwegian Case Study Author: Gordon, Daniel V., Asche, Frank, Bjorndal, Trond Research Paper Title: Over-capacity, Regulation and Rent: A Norwegian Case Study Author: Gordon, Daniel V., Asche, Frank, Bjorndal, Trond Research Paper Close

• 8. [Article] A bioeconomic MPA study based on cellular automata population growth and distribution

  Abstract only.

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: A bioeconomic MPA study based on cellular automata population growth and distribution Author: Eide, Arne Abstract only. Title: A bioeconomic MPA study based on cellular automata population growth and distribution Author: Eide, Arne Abstract only. Close

• 9. [Article] Determinants of fishermen’s compliance - lessons from a coastal fishery in Biscay Bay

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Determinants of fishermen’s compliance - lessons from a coastal fishery in Biscay Bay Author: Raux, Pascal, Bailly, Denis, Roncin, Nicolas Research Paper Title: Determinants of fishermen’s compliance - lessons from a coastal fishery in Biscay Bay Author: Raux, Pascal, Bailly, Denis, Roncin, Nicolas Research Paper Close

• 10. [Article] Managing Capacity in An Ivq (Individual Vessel Quota) Regime

  No poster available.

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Managing Capacity in An Ivq (Individual Vessel Quota) Regime Author: Standal, Dag No poster available. Title: Managing Capacity in An Ivq (Individual Vessel Quota) Regime Author: Standal, Dag No poster available. Close