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• 191. [Article] The Promotion of Responsible Trawl Fishing Practices in South East Asia : The Introduction of Juvenile and Trash Excluder Devices (JTEDs)

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Promotion of Responsible Trawl Fishing Practices in South East Asia : The Introduction of Juvenile and Trash Excluder Devices (JTEDs) Author: Chokesanguan, Bundit Research Paper Title: The Promotion of Responsible Trawl Fishing Practices in South East Asia : The Introduction of Juvenile and Trash Excluder Devices (JTEDs) Author: Chokesanguan, Bundit Research Paper Close

• 192. [Article] Sustainable aquaculture development for poverty alleviation in northern uplands of Vietnam with women involvement

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Sustainable aquaculture development for poverty alleviation in northern uplands of Vietnam with women involvement Author: Mowla, Runia, Kibria, MD. Ghulam Research Paper Title: Sustainable aquaculture development for poverty alleviation in northern uplands of Vietnam with women involvement Author: Mowla, Runia, Kibria, MD. Ghulam Research Paper Close

• 193. [Article] Commercial Fishing License Limitation in the State of Alaska: A Controversial System of Grandfather Rights

  After two failed attempts to establish limited entry in its salmon fisheries,iii pursuant to legislation adopted by the Alaska Legislature in 1973, Alaska placed its primary salmon fisheries under limitation ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Commercial Fishing License Limitation in the State of Alaska: A Controversial System of Grandfather Rights Author: Twomley, Bruce Year: 2001 After two failed attempts to establish limited entry in its salmon fisheries,iii pursuant to legislation adopted by the Alaska Legislature in 1973, Alaska placed its primary salmon fisheries under limitation by 1975. Alaska persisted in seeking limited entry largely in response to declining salmon resources coupled with increasing levels of participation. Alaska’s system limited the number of gear licenses to a maximum number which must be equal to or greater than the highest number of units of gear present in a particular fishery during the four years prior to limitation. With all prior participants eligible to apply, the number of eligible applicants was generally far greater than the maximum number. Under an elaborate system of grandfather rights, permanent entry permits have been awarded to those fishers who demonstrated the most dependence upon a particular fishery, as measured by their past participation and economic dependence. Eligible fishers may continue to fish until there is a final determination on their applications. Permanent entry permits are, for the most part, freely transferable and inheritable, subject to some restriction (for example, permits may neither be leased nor pledged as security for a debt). Salmon fishers helped design Alaska’s program for Alaska’s salmon fleet, which consisted largely of individual fishers who owned and operated their own vessels. The program achieved a moratorium on new entrants and a gradual reduction of units of gear toward the maximum number as individual claims to permits were resolved. Alaska’s license limitation program contributes to limiting fishing capacity, because it is coupled with other limitations on effort such as vessel size and gear restriction. Taken together, Alaska’s license limitation and other management tools allow managers to calculate with some assurance the power of the fishing fleets they seek to control. Although the program is neutral as to residency, the percentages of permits held by Alaskans have tended to remain stable from the time of initial limitation. Alaska’s program has always been controversial. The allocation system is complicated, expensive, and requires years to complete. While the program has survived all major legal challenges, courts have modified the program. Although the percentage of permits held by Alaskan residents has remained stable, in some areas, the number of permits held by local, rural Alaska residents has declined. Additionally, the high cost of permits in valuable fisheries has made initial entry into some fisheries difficult. Alaska’s license limitation program is most useful in fisheries that resemble Alaska salmon fisheries. The more a fishery departs from the Alaska salmon fishery model (as a fleet of individual owner-operators), the less likely it is that Alaska’s form of license limitation would be of value. Title: Commercial Fishing License Limitation in the State of Alaska: A Controversial System of Grandfather Rights Author: Twomley, Bruce Year: 2001 After two failed attempts to establish limited entry in its salmon fisheries,iii pursuant to legislation adopted by the Alaska Legislature in 1973, Alaska placed its primary salmon fisheries under limitation by 1975. Alaska persisted in seeking limited entry largely in response to declining salmon resources coupled with increasing levels of participation. Alaska’s system limited the number of gear licenses to a maximum number which must be equal to or greater than the highest number of units of gear present in a particular fishery during the four years prior to limitation. With all prior participants eligible to apply, the number of eligible applicants was generally far greater than the maximum number. Under an elaborate system of grandfather rights, permanent entry permits have been awarded to those fishers who demonstrated the most dependence upon a particular fishery, as measured by their past participation and economic dependence. Eligible fishers may continue to fish until there is a final determination on their applications. Permanent entry permits are, for the most part, freely transferable and inheritable, subject to some restriction (for example, permits may neither be leased nor pledged as security for a debt). Salmon fishers helped design Alaska’s program for Alaska’s salmon fleet, which consisted largely of individual fishers who owned and operated their own vessels. The program achieved a moratorium on new entrants and a gradual reduction of units of gear toward the maximum number as individual claims to permits were resolved. Alaska’s license limitation program contributes to limiting fishing capacity, because it is coupled with other limitations on effort such as vessel size and gear restriction. Taken together, Alaska’s license limitation and other management tools allow managers to calculate with some assurance the power of the fishing fleets they seek to control. Although the program is neutral as to residency, the percentages of permits held by Alaskans have tended to remain stable from the time of initial limitation. Alaska’s program has always been controversial. The allocation system is complicated, expensive, and requires years to complete. While the program has survived all major legal challenges, courts have modified the program. Although the percentage of permits held by Alaskan residents has remained stable, in some areas, the number of permits held by local, rural Alaska residents has declined. Additionally, the high cost of permits in valuable fisheries has made initial entry into some fisheries difficult. Alaska’s license limitation program is most useful in fisheries that resemble Alaska salmon fisheries. The more a fishery departs from the Alaska salmon fishery model (as a fleet of individual owner-operators), the less likely it is that Alaska’s form of license limitation would be of value. Close

• 194. [Article] Conflict in Fishery Resource Utilization: The Case of Light Luring Anchovy Fishery in Thailand

  In late 1999 Artisanal Fisherman Association in Thailand requested the government to take actions in curbing destructive anchovy fishing gears. They believed that anchovy fishing was the main cause of ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Conflict in Fishery Resource Utilization: The Case of Light Luring Anchovy Fishery in Thailand Author: Tokrisna, Ruangrai Year: 2001 In late 1999 Artisanal Fisherman Association in Thailand requested the government to take actions in curbing destructive anchovy fishing gears. They believed that anchovy fishing was the main cause of fishery resource depletion in their fishing grounds. Main anchovy fishing gears were light luring falling net, purse seine, and scoop net. All of them are Juvenile bycatch varied from 1.72 – 30.37% of total catches depending on gear type, vessel size, fishing ground, fishing month, and fishing year. Economic losses of juvenile bycatch were $1 – 331/boat/trip. In Songkhla, the crisis problem area, economic losses from light luring falling net were as high as 0.42 – 7.64 times of the return from anchovy. The losses from light luring anchovy purse seine were 23 – 35% of the return from anchovy. The losses from light luring scoop net varied around 2 – 7%. Anchovy catch values in Thailand was $26 million in 1997. Value added from processing was $65 million, mainly from fish sauce. In spite of low value added, 59% of the catches were processed as boiled-dried/dried anchovy mainly for export. 44% of the anchovy value in the importing country were the trade margins, including tax, in importing country. Fishing cost was 20%. This cost estimation did not include the economic loss from juvenile bycatch. Processing and marketing costs in Thailand amounted to 19%. Profit margins for domestic fishermen, processors and traders added up to 17%. Thailand might have been exporting anchovy at an underpaid resource value. The relatively better return from anchovy had led to rapid increase in anchovy fishing effort. If fishing effort exceeded carrying capacity especially in habitats of juvenile economic species, it could lead to decrease in fishing income due to resource depletion not only for artisanal fishermen but anchovy fishermen as well. Recommendations were to determine optimum fishing effort in specific fishing grounds and control the effort. Where there had been overfishing, auction on fishing license and fee on anchovy fishing on the basis of economic loss could be introduced. Coastal community should take part in controlling anchovy fishing effort. Relocation of artisanal fishermen through training and support on initial investment in nonfishing sector was recommended. Title: Conflict in Fishery Resource Utilization: The Case of Light Luring Anchovy Fishery in Thailand Author: Tokrisna, Ruangrai Year: 2001 In late 1999 Artisanal Fisherman Association in Thailand requested the government to take actions in curbing destructive anchovy fishing gears. They believed that anchovy fishing was the main cause of fishery resource depletion in their fishing grounds. Main anchovy fishing gears were light luring falling net, purse seine, and scoop net. All of them are Juvenile bycatch varied from 1.72 – 30.37% of total catches depending on gear type, vessel size, fishing ground, fishing month, and fishing year. Economic losses of juvenile bycatch were $1 – 331/boat/trip. In Songkhla, the crisis problem area, economic losses from light luring falling net were as high as 0.42 – 7.64 times of the return from anchovy. The losses from light luring anchovy purse seine were 23 – 35% of the return from anchovy. The losses from light luring scoop net varied around 2 – 7%. Anchovy catch values in Thailand was $26 million in 1997. Value added from processing was $65 million, mainly from fish sauce. In spite of low value added, 59% of the catches were processed as boiled-dried/dried anchovy mainly for export. 44% of the anchovy value in the importing country were the trade margins, including tax, in importing country. Fishing cost was 20%. This cost estimation did not include the economic loss from juvenile bycatch. Processing and marketing costs in Thailand amounted to 19%. Profit margins for domestic fishermen, processors and traders added up to 17%. Thailand might have been exporting anchovy at an underpaid resource value. The relatively better return from anchovy had led to rapid increase in anchovy fishing effort. If fishing effort exceeded carrying capacity especially in habitats of juvenile economic species, it could lead to decrease in fishing income due to resource depletion not only for artisanal fishermen but anchovy fishermen as well. Recommendations were to determine optimum fishing effort in specific fishing grounds and control the effort. Where there had been overfishing, auction on fishing license and fee on anchovy fishing on the basis of economic loss could be introduced. Coastal community should take part in controlling anchovy fishing effort. Relocation of artisanal fishermen through training and support on initial investment in nonfishing sector was recommended. Close