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• 11. [Article] The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study

  Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study Author: Thebaud, Olivier Year: 2001 Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. The discussion of management measures implicitly assumes that an external intervention will be possible - usually by the State - either to regulate directly resource use, or to allocate and enforce private use rights in order for decentralised co-ordination systems to operate efficiently. At first sight, economic models developed to explain fisheries over-exploitation leave little hope for selfregulation to emerge from a competitive fishery. The paper focuses on the analytical issues underlying the on-going debate on the possibility for fisheries to be self-regulated. Based on the analysis of a historical case study - the development of management arrangements between whaling firms in the 1930ies and 1950-60ies - it shows that the absence of a central authority cannot be systematically associated to an absence of regulation, and explores some of the implications this has for the economic analysis of fisheries management. Title: The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study Author: Thebaud, Olivier Year: 2001 Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. The discussion of management measures implicitly assumes that an external intervention will be possible - usually by the State - either to regulate directly resource use, or to allocate and enforce private use rights in order for decentralised co-ordination systems to operate efficiently. At first sight, economic models developed to explain fisheries over-exploitation leave little hope for selfregulation to emerge from a competitive fishery. The paper focuses on the analytical issues underlying the on-going debate on the possibility for fisheries to be self-regulated. Based on the analysis of a historical case study - the development of management arrangements between whaling firms in the 1930ies and 1950-60ies - it shows that the absence of a central authority cannot be systematically associated to an absence of regulation, and explores some of the implications this has for the economic analysis of fisheries management. Close

• 12. [Article] Social Class Differentiations and the Regulation of Coastal Resources in New Zealand

  Indigenous fishing rights are partially recognized via allocation of commercial quota rights to tribes. Concern exists, however, that the allocation of commercial quota rights to indigenous groups without ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Social Class Differentiations and the Regulation of Coastal Resources in New Zealand Author: Bodwitch, Hekia Indigenous fishing rights are partially recognized via allocation of commercial quota rights to tribes. Concern exists, however, that the allocation of commercial quota rights to indigenous groups without restrictions on how the benefits from quota holdings can be allocated and exchanged will lead to class segregation within indigenous groups. Scholars writing about indigenous fishing rights in New Zealand, where tribal quota ownership and exchange is less regulated than in North America, have expressed concern that a “tribal capitalism” is emerging, whereby tribal elites accumulate wealth at the expense of local fishers, ostensibly the intended beneficiaries of tribal quota holdings. This paper examines the extent to which exchange of quota and coastal resources influences social class differentiation in New Zealand’s South Island, home to some of the nation’s most economically productive Maori fishing enterprises. Drawing on ethnographic data, it becomes clear that tribal quota holdings are not the driver effecting how benefits from resources are distributed. Rather, differential regulation between upstream and downstream coastal resources effects how wealth is accumulated in the watershed, patterns that largely fall along racial lines. Those who own private property, primarily non-Maori, are less regulated in their wealth accumulation than Maori who historically were pushed to the coasts, historic injustices indigenous fishing rights are designed to address. This analysis refocuses responsibility away from indigenous communities and onto the government’s regulatory practices, indicating that upstream regulation, as opposed to additional restrictions on tribal resource rights, will likely lead to more equitable distribution of coastal resource benefits. Title: Social Class Differentiations and the Regulation of Coastal Resources in New Zealand Author: Bodwitch, Hekia Indigenous fishing rights are partially recognized via allocation of commercial quota rights to tribes. Concern exists, however, that the allocation of commercial quota rights to indigenous groups without restrictions on how the benefits from quota holdings can be allocated and exchanged will lead to class segregation within indigenous groups. Scholars writing about indigenous fishing rights in New Zealand, where tribal quota ownership and exchange is less regulated than in North America, have expressed concern that a “tribal capitalism” is emerging, whereby tribal elites accumulate wealth at the expense of local fishers, ostensibly the intended beneficiaries of tribal quota holdings. This paper examines the extent to which exchange of quota and coastal resources influences social class differentiation in New Zealand’s South Island, home to some of the nation’s most economically productive Maori fishing enterprises. Drawing on ethnographic data, it becomes clear that tribal quota holdings are not the driver effecting how benefits from resources are distributed. Rather, differential regulation between upstream and downstream coastal resources effects how wealth is accumulated in the watershed, patterns that largely fall along racial lines. Those who own private property, primarily non-Maori, are less regulated in their wealth accumulation than Maori who historically were pushed to the coasts, historic injustices indigenous fishing rights are designed to address. This analysis refocuses responsibility away from indigenous communities and onto the government’s regulatory practices, indicating that upstream regulation, as opposed to additional restrictions on tribal resource rights, will likely lead to more equitable distribution of coastal resource benefits. Close

• 13. [Article] Effect of Trap Soak-time on the Trap-selectivity Profile and By-kill in Prawn-trap Fisheries

  Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans seeks to manage British Columbia’s prawn fishery by limiting the season length, vessel entry, and the number of prawn traps per vessel. However, fishers can ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Effect of Trap Soak-time on the Trap-selectivity Profile and By-kill in Prawn-trap Fisheries Author: Wright, Christopher S., Panek, Peter Year: 2001 Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans seeks to manage British Columbia’s prawn fishery by limiting the season length, vessel entry, and the number of prawn traps per vessel. However, fishers can still adjust their effort by increasing the number of trap lifts during the season. This study examines the effect of trap soak-time on size-selectivity, looks at how it translates to by-kill, and reviews the traditional management responses. The management recommendations in this paper focus on optimizing the interaction between CPUE, by-kill, enforcement costs, and fisher responses. Peer’s law (the solution to a problem changes the problem) predicts that trying to solve a fishery common-property resource problem only changes the problem’s expression. Thus, limiting entry changes a too-many-fishers issue to a capital-stuffing problem, limiting gear changes a capital-stuffing problem to a gear-use issue, and regulating gear use leads to other problems and ever more micro-management. Thus, regulation and related costs have become part of the problem of rent dissipation and poverty in fishery dependent communities. Efforts to fine-tune regulations in BC’s prawn fishery have led to an ever expanding spiral of costly, clumsy, and intrusive regulations, enforcement, and related procedures that dissipate resource rents, frustrate fishers, and ultimately are ineffective in protecting the resource and/or the associated jobs. The best way out of this morass appears to be for managers of sedentary species to confine their efforts to macro-management regulations that focus on limiting the consequences of fishing and ensuring that individual fishers endure the consequences of their actions. Title: Effect of Trap Soak-time on the Trap-selectivity Profile and By-kill in Prawn-trap Fisheries Author: Wright, Christopher S., Panek, Peter Year: 2001 Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans seeks to manage British Columbia’s prawn fishery by limiting the season length, vessel entry, and the number of prawn traps per vessel. However, fishers can still adjust their effort by increasing the number of trap lifts during the season. This study examines the effect of trap soak-time on size-selectivity, looks at how it translates to by-kill, and reviews the traditional management responses. The management recommendations in this paper focus on optimizing the interaction between CPUE, by-kill, enforcement costs, and fisher responses. Peer’s law (the solution to a problem changes the problem) predicts that trying to solve a fishery common-property resource problem only changes the problem’s expression. Thus, limiting entry changes a too-many-fishers issue to a capital-stuffing problem, limiting gear changes a capital-stuffing problem to a gear-use issue, and regulating gear use leads to other problems and ever more micro-management. Thus, regulation and related costs have become part of the problem of rent dissipation and poverty in fishery dependent communities. Efforts to fine-tune regulations in BC’s prawn fishery have led to an ever expanding spiral of costly, clumsy, and intrusive regulations, enforcement, and related procedures that dissipate resource rents, frustrate fishers, and ultimately are ineffective in protecting the resource and/or the associated jobs. The best way out of this morass appears to be for managers of sedentary species to confine their efforts to macro-management regulations that focus on limiting the consequences of fishing and ensuring that individual fishers endure the consequences of their actions. Close

• 14. [Article] Are Catfish Inspections an Administrative Trade Barrier to Imported Fish?

  The Agricultural Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-79) amended legislation regarding the U.S. catfish inspection program to include “all fish of the order Siluriformes,” encompassing imported species: basa, ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Are Catfish Inspections an Administrative Trade Barrier to Imported Fish? Author: Kropp, Jaclyn D., Davidson, Kelly The Agricultural Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-79) amended legislation regarding the U.S. catfish inspection program to include “all fish of the order Siluriformes,” encompassing imported species: basa, tra, and pangasius. Furthermore, the amendment finalized the transition of catfish and catfish-like product inspection responsibilities to the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), leaving all other fish species under FDA inspection. The shift in responsibility produces tighter food safety mandates for domestically produced and imported catfish, which some argue acts as an administrative trade barrier protecting the U.S. catfish industry. Since domestic producers were likely subject to similar standards under FDA inspection, the cost of compliance is likely higher for international fish farmers who mostly operate in low-income countries. We analyze the potential trade distortions of the regulation change on domestic catfish production and imported products. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of the new regulation on the market share of imported fish products relative to domestic production. The reformed legislation will likely decrease market competition from imported catfish-like products. Additionally, the competition from tilapia imports might increase since tilapia inspection remains under FDA regulation and there is evidence that consumers view catfish and tilapia as substitutes. Using data from the USDA Economic Research Service and NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service, we estimate the potential effects of the new regulation under various assumptions regarding the cost of compliance. The impact of the new regulation depends on assumptions pertaining to the differences in compliance costs across industries and markets (domestic versus foreign). Title: Are Catfish Inspections an Administrative Trade Barrier to Imported Fish? Author: Kropp, Jaclyn D., Davidson, Kelly The Agricultural Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-79) amended legislation regarding the U.S. catfish inspection program to include “all fish of the order Siluriformes,” encompassing imported species: basa, tra, and pangasius. Furthermore, the amendment finalized the transition of catfish and catfish-like product inspection responsibilities to the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), leaving all other fish species under FDA inspection. The shift in responsibility produces tighter food safety mandates for domestically produced and imported catfish, which some argue acts as an administrative trade barrier protecting the U.S. catfish industry. Since domestic producers were likely subject to similar standards under FDA inspection, the cost of compliance is likely higher for international fish farmers who mostly operate in low-income countries. We analyze the potential trade distortions of the regulation change on domestic catfish production and imported products. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of the new regulation on the market share of imported fish products relative to domestic production. The reformed legislation will likely decrease market competition from imported catfish-like products. Additionally, the competition from tilapia imports might increase since tilapia inspection remains under FDA regulation and there is evidence that consumers view catfish and tilapia as substitutes. Using data from the USDA Economic Research Service and NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service, we estimate the potential effects of the new regulation under various assumptions regarding the cost of compliance. The impact of the new regulation depends on assumptions pertaining to the differences in compliance costs across industries and markets (domestic versus foreign). Close

• 15. [Article] Biosecurity vs. Profits: A Multi-Objective Model for the Aquaculture Industry

  In this paper we measure the value of sanitary restrictions in terms of forgone profits. For this we model the trade-off between biosecurity and profits in the salmon aquaculture industry. We introduce ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Biosecurity vs. Profits: A Multi-Objective Model for the Aquaculture Industry Author: Estay-Montecinos, Manuel, Dresdner-Cid, Jorge In this paper we measure the value of sanitary restrictions in terms of forgone profits. For this we model the trade-off between biosecurity and profits in the salmon aquaculture industry. We introduce the concept of “sanitary desirable volume” of the salmon industry, as a goal in a bi-objective model. We are able to optimize this model, using base information relevant for the Los Lagos Region in Chile, and identify a Pareto Frontier. Within this setting we analyze the shadow price of one objective in terms of the other, the effect of changes in the administrative regulations that limit fish density in the farms, and of prices on the Pareto frontier. We find that the effect of sanitary restrictions in terms of forgone profits is quantitatively important and that this effect is dependent on the level of sanitary restrictions and on the relative product prices. This has important implications for the design of sanitary restrictions. The level of the sanitary desirable volume should be determined carefully to avoid costly excessive regulation. Moreover, market conditions can also affect the optimal level of regulation. Title: Biosecurity vs. Profits: A Multi-Objective Model for the Aquaculture Industry Author: Estay-Montecinos, Manuel, Dresdner-Cid, Jorge In this paper we measure the value of sanitary restrictions in terms of forgone profits. For this we model the trade-off between biosecurity and profits in the salmon aquaculture industry. We introduce the concept of “sanitary desirable volume” of the salmon industry, as a goal in a bi-objective model. We are able to optimize this model, using base information relevant for the Los Lagos Region in Chile, and identify a Pareto Frontier. Within this setting we analyze the shadow price of one objective in terms of the other, the effect of changes in the administrative regulations that limit fish density in the farms, and of prices on the Pareto frontier. We find that the effect of sanitary restrictions in terms of forgone profits is quantitatively important and that this effect is dependent on the level of sanitary restrictions and on the relative product prices. This has important implications for the design of sanitary restrictions. The level of the sanitary desirable volume should be determined carefully to avoid costly excessive regulation. Moreover, market conditions can also affect the optimal level of regulation. Close

• 16. [Article] Institutional Changes to Fisheries Management Systems Caused by the TAC in Japan

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Institutional Changes to Fisheries Management Systems Caused by the TAC in Japan Author: Hidaka, Takeshi Research Paper Title: Institutional Changes to Fisheries Management Systems Caused by the TAC in Japan Author: Hidaka, Takeshi Research Paper Close

• 17. [Article] Resource allocation by contest or bargaining

  IIFET 2008 paper presentation by Eirik Mikkelsen from the Northern Research Institute Tromso.

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Resource allocation by contest or bargaining Author: Mikkelsen, Eirik IIFET 2008 paper presentation by Eirik Mikkelsen from the Northern Research Institute Tromso. Title: Resource allocation by contest or bargaining Author: Mikkelsen, Eirik IIFET 2008 paper presentation by Eirik Mikkelsen from the Northern Research Institute Tromso. Close

• 18. [Article] Important Factors Influencing Rule Compliance in Fisheries Lessons from Danish Fisheries

  This paper presents the results of a research project, which has focused on Danish fishers’ acceptance of imposed fisheries regulations and their respect for the management system. The analytical framework ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Important Factors Influencing Rule Compliance in Fisheries Lessons from Danish Fisheries Author: Mathiesen, Christoph, Nielsen, Jesper Raakjaer Year: 2001 This paper presents the results of a research project, which has focused on Danish fishers’ acceptance of imposed fisheries regulations and their respect for the management system. The analytical framework developed by Raakjær Nielsen (1998) and Raakjær Nielsen and Vedsmand (1999) has been used. The research has focused on three Danish fisheries: the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea, the demersal and Nephrops fishery in Kattegat and the fishery for non-human consumption species in the North Sea. The research is based on interviews with 56 fishers and a mail survey covering all vessels in the three selected fisheries. The following factors are concluded to have a major impact on rule compliance in fisheries: 1) the economic gains to be obtained; 2) the risk of being detected and the severity of the sanction; 3) the compatibility between the content of the regulation and the fishing patterns and practise; 4) regulation leads towards stock conservation; 5) norms, in particular the behaviour of other fishers and the moral of the individual fisher. In addition there are some indication, that co-management is important for rule compliance. Title: Important Factors Influencing Rule Compliance in Fisheries Lessons from Danish Fisheries Author: Mathiesen, Christoph, Nielsen, Jesper Raakjaer Year: 2001 This paper presents the results of a research project, which has focused on Danish fishers’ acceptance of imposed fisheries regulations and their respect for the management system. The analytical framework developed by Raakjær Nielsen (1998) and Raakjær Nielsen and Vedsmand (1999) has been used. The research has focused on three Danish fisheries: the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea, the demersal and Nephrops fishery in Kattegat and the fishery for non-human consumption species in the North Sea. The research is based on interviews with 56 fishers and a mail survey covering all vessels in the three selected fisheries. The following factors are concluded to have a major impact on rule compliance in fisheries: 1) the economic gains to be obtained; 2) the risk of being detected and the severity of the sanction; 3) the compatibility between the content of the regulation and the fishing patterns and practise; 4) regulation leads towards stock conservation; 5) norms, in particular the behaviour of other fishers and the moral of the individual fisher. In addition there are some indication, that co-management is important for rule compliance. Close

• 19. [Article] Technical Efficiency and Fishing Skill in Developing Country Fisheries: The Kedah, Malaysia Trawl Fishery

  The question arises for fishery managers as to whether or not there are observable and measurable attributes of the skipper or vessel that fishery managers can monitor and possibly regulate to control ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Technical Efficiency and Fishing Skill in Developing Country Fisheries: The Kedah, Malaysia Trawl Fishery Author: Viswanathan, K. Kuperan, Squires, Dale, Kirkley, James, Susilowati, Indah, Omar, Ishak Haji, Jeon, Yongil Year: 2001 The question arises for fishery managers as to whether or not there are observable and measurable attributes of the skipper or vessel that fishery managers can monitor and possibly regulate to control expansions in fishing capacity from this source. This paper addresses this neglected issue of resource management through a case study of the trawler fishery in the state of Kedah in Peninsular Malaysia. In the Kedah trawl fishery, skipper characteristics other than ethnicity did not significantly affect technical efficiency and skipper skill. Hence, there does not appear to be any readily observable characteristics pertaining to skipper skill to monitor and regulate. This finding militates against regulating skipper skill to control expansions in fishing capacity that can happen under license limitation. The results indicate that a skipper training program for the least efficient skippers may be called for to meet the objectives of equity and fairness as expressed in the New Economic Policy and its successor, the New Development Plan. Such a training program would also be consistent with one of the initial aims of the license limitation program, which was to promote equity among all ethnic groups in Malaysian society. Title: Technical Efficiency and Fishing Skill in Developing Country Fisheries: The Kedah, Malaysia Trawl Fishery Author: Viswanathan, K. Kuperan, Squires, Dale, Kirkley, James, Susilowati, Indah, Omar, Ishak Haji, Jeon, Yongil Year: 2001 The question arises for fishery managers as to whether or not there are observable and measurable attributes of the skipper or vessel that fishery managers can monitor and possibly regulate to control expansions in fishing capacity from this source. This paper addresses this neglected issue of resource management through a case study of the trawler fishery in the state of Kedah in Peninsular Malaysia. In the Kedah trawl fishery, skipper characteristics other than ethnicity did not significantly affect technical efficiency and skipper skill. Hence, there does not appear to be any readily observable characteristics pertaining to skipper skill to monitor and regulate. This finding militates against regulating skipper skill to control expansions in fishing capacity that can happen under license limitation. The results indicate that a skipper training program for the least efficient skippers may be called for to meet the objectives of equity and fairness as expressed in the New Economic Policy and its successor, the New Development Plan. Such a training program would also be consistent with one of the initial aims of the license limitation program, which was to promote equity among all ethnic groups in Malaysian society. Close

• 20. [Article] Fisheries Management and Rule of Law

  Fishing is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the U.S. economy. Theoretically, regulating an industry means subjecting it to the rule of law: treating those with an interest in the resource ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Fisheries Management and Rule of Law Author: McEvoy, Arthur F. Year: 2001 Fishing is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the U.S. economy. Theoretically, regulating an industry means subjecting it to the rule of law: treating those with an interest in the resource fairly while preserving the public interest in public order, economic efficiency, and conservation. There are, however, two opposing concepts of “rule of law,” each with deep roots in U.S. legal culture, that conflict with each other and frequently stymie efforts to regulate fisheries successfully. One of these concepts is the classical liberal idea of autonomy, which stresses the individual’s right to pursue his/her self-interest free of state interference. Rule of law here means that the state should guarantee private ordering, treat everyone alike, and promote private enterprise. The other is the Jeffersonian, or republican, idea of participation, which stresses the equal participation of all citizens in self-government. Throughout U.S. history, these two norms have co-existed uncomfortably with each other as sources of legitimacy for regulatory regimes. Liberal thinking predominated in the nineteenth century, although it clearly underlies limited-entry and other property-oriented regimes today. Republican thinking has emerged more recently in co-management regimes that stress the participation of user groups in data-gathering, policymaking, and enforcement. Somewhere in between is the New Deal style of governance, on which the Magnuson Act of 1976 is based. Title: Fisheries Management and Rule of Law Author: McEvoy, Arthur F. Year: 2001 Fishing is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the U.S. economy. Theoretically, regulating an industry means subjecting it to the rule of law: treating those with an interest in the resource fairly while preserving the public interest in public order, economic efficiency, and conservation. There are, however, two opposing concepts of “rule of law,” each with deep roots in U.S. legal culture, that conflict with each other and frequently stymie efforts to regulate fisheries successfully. One of these concepts is the classical liberal idea of autonomy, which stresses the individual’s right to pursue his/her self-interest free of state interference. Rule of law here means that the state should guarantee private ordering, treat everyone alike, and promote private enterprise. The other is the Jeffersonian, or republican, idea of participation, which stresses the equal participation of all citizens in self-government. Throughout U.S. history, these two norms have co-existed uncomfortably with each other as sources of legitimacy for regulatory regimes. Liberal thinking predominated in the nineteenth century, although it clearly underlies limited-entry and other property-oriented regimes today. Republican thinking has emerged more recently in co-management regimes that stress the participation of user groups in data-gathering, policymaking, and enforcement. Somewhere in between is the New Deal style of governance, on which the Magnuson Act of 1976 is based. Close