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• 1. [Article] Conservation for Sale: A Dynamic Common Agency Model of Natural Resource Regulation

  This paper considers the regulation of a natural resource within a dynamic common agency framework. In setting harvest quotas, the regulator responds to lobbying pressure (contributions) from harvesters ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Conservation for Sale: A Dynamic Common Agency Model of Natural Resource Regulation Author: Boyce, John R. Year: 2001 This paper considers the regulation of a natural resource within a dynamic common agency framework. In setting harvest quotas, the regulator responds to lobbying pressure (contributions) from harvesters and conservationists. The truthful Markov perfect equilibrium stock is then an increasing function of the effective political weight for conservationists. Since the contributions to the regulator are independent of the no-regulation equilibrium, both individual and aggregate welfare may decline by adopting regulation. Indeed, harvesters operating under private property will always oppose regulation, and harvesters operating under common property will oppose regulation if their welfare is not valued highly enough by the regulator. Since conservationists’ gross welfare is always improved by regulation, and since the regulator cannot fully capture their rents, conservationists will support regulation. For regulation to be supported by harvesters and conservationists, it is more important that the welfare of harvesters be taken into account by the regulator. This is because harvesters, like conservationists, value the stock, but conservationists, unlike harvesters, place no value on the harvests. Title: Conservation for Sale: A Dynamic Common Agency Model of Natural Resource Regulation Author: Boyce, John R. Year: 2001 This paper considers the regulation of a natural resource within a dynamic common agency framework. In setting harvest quotas, the regulator responds to lobbying pressure (contributions) from harvesters and conservationists. The truthful Markov perfect equilibrium stock is then an increasing function of the effective political weight for conservationists. Since the contributions to the regulator are independent of the no-regulation equilibrium, both individual and aggregate welfare may decline by adopting regulation. Indeed, harvesters operating under private property will always oppose regulation, and harvesters operating under common property will oppose regulation if their welfare is not valued highly enough by the regulator. Since conservationists’ gross welfare is always improved by regulation, and since the regulator cannot fully capture their rents, conservationists will support regulation. For regulation to be supported by harvesters and conservationists, it is more important that the welfare of harvesters be taken into account by the regulator. This is because harvesters, like conservationists, value the stock, but conservationists, unlike harvesters, place no value on the harvests. Close

• 2. [Article] Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish

  Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish Author: Poole, Erik Year: 2001 Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort is regulated and effort caps appear to be binding, I argue that social choice of political lobbying effort becomes the principal choice variable by which commercial fishermen continue to press for additional fishing opportunities relative to the regulator’s desired catch target. The model helps explain recent fish stock collapses. The analysis also questions the appropriateness of continuing the fishing category of Canadian employment insurance as the regulator embraces a precautionary, risk averse approach to fisheries management. Title: Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish Author: Poole, Erik Year: 2001 Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort is regulated and effort caps appear to be binding, I argue that social choice of political lobbying effort becomes the principal choice variable by which commercial fishermen continue to press for additional fishing opportunities relative to the regulator’s desired catch target. The model helps explain recent fish stock collapses. The analysis also questions the appropriateness of continuing the fishing category of Canadian employment insurance as the regulator embraces a precautionary, risk averse approach to fisheries management. Close

• 3. [Article] The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study

  Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study Author: Thebaud, Olivier Year: 2001 Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. The discussion of management measures implicitly assumes that an external intervention will be possible - usually by the State - either to regulate directly resource use, or to allocate and enforce private use rights in order for decentralised co-ordination systems to operate efficiently. At first sight, economic models developed to explain fisheries over-exploitation leave little hope for selfregulation to emerge from a competitive fishery. The paper focuses on the analytical issues underlying the on-going debate on the possibility for fisheries to be self-regulated. Based on the analysis of a historical case study - the development of management arrangements between whaling firms in the 1930ies and 1950-60ies - it shows that the absence of a central authority cannot be systematically associated to an absence of regulation, and explores some of the implications this has for the economic analysis of fisheries management. Title: The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study Author: Thebaud, Olivier Year: 2001 Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. The discussion of management measures implicitly assumes that an external intervention will be possible - usually by the State - either to regulate directly resource use, or to allocate and enforce private use rights in order for decentralised co-ordination systems to operate efficiently. At first sight, economic models developed to explain fisheries over-exploitation leave little hope for selfregulation to emerge from a competitive fishery. The paper focuses on the analytical issues underlying the on-going debate on the possibility for fisheries to be self-regulated. Based on the analysis of a historical case study - the development of management arrangements between whaling firms in the 1930ies and 1950-60ies - it shows that the absence of a central authority cannot be systematically associated to an absence of regulation, and explores some of the implications this has for the economic analysis of fisheries management. Close

• 4. [Article] Effect of Trap Soak-time on the Trap-selectivity Profile and By-kill in Prawn-trap Fisheries

  Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans seeks to manage British Columbia’s prawn fishery by limiting the season length, vessel entry, and the number of prawn traps per vessel. However, fishers can ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Effect of Trap Soak-time on the Trap-selectivity Profile and By-kill in Prawn-trap Fisheries Author: Wright, Christopher S., Panek, Peter Year: 2001 Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans seeks to manage British Columbia’s prawn fishery by limiting the season length, vessel entry, and the number of prawn traps per vessel. However, fishers can still adjust their effort by increasing the number of trap lifts during the season. This study examines the effect of trap soak-time on size-selectivity, looks at how it translates to by-kill, and reviews the traditional management responses. The management recommendations in this paper focus on optimizing the interaction between CPUE, by-kill, enforcement costs, and fisher responses. Peer’s law (the solution to a problem changes the problem) predicts that trying to solve a fishery common-property resource problem only changes the problem’s expression. Thus, limiting entry changes a too-many-fishers issue to a capital-stuffing problem, limiting gear changes a capital-stuffing problem to a gear-use issue, and regulating gear use leads to other problems and ever more micro-management. Thus, regulation and related costs have become part of the problem of rent dissipation and poverty in fishery dependent communities. Efforts to fine-tune regulations in BC’s prawn fishery have led to an ever expanding spiral of costly, clumsy, and intrusive regulations, enforcement, and related procedures that dissipate resource rents, frustrate fishers, and ultimately are ineffective in protecting the resource and/or the associated jobs. The best way out of this morass appears to be for managers of sedentary species to confine their efforts to macro-management regulations that focus on limiting the consequences of fishing and ensuring that individual fishers endure the consequences of their actions. Title: Effect of Trap Soak-time on the Trap-selectivity Profile and By-kill in Prawn-trap Fisheries Author: Wright, Christopher S., Panek, Peter Year: 2001 Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans seeks to manage British Columbia’s prawn fishery by limiting the season length, vessel entry, and the number of prawn traps per vessel. However, fishers can still adjust their effort by increasing the number of trap lifts during the season. This study examines the effect of trap soak-time on size-selectivity, looks at how it translates to by-kill, and reviews the traditional management responses. The management recommendations in this paper focus on optimizing the interaction between CPUE, by-kill, enforcement costs, and fisher responses. Peer’s law (the solution to a problem changes the problem) predicts that trying to solve a fishery common-property resource problem only changes the problem’s expression. Thus, limiting entry changes a too-many-fishers issue to a capital-stuffing problem, limiting gear changes a capital-stuffing problem to a gear-use issue, and regulating gear use leads to other problems and ever more micro-management. Thus, regulation and related costs have become part of the problem of rent dissipation and poverty in fishery dependent communities. Efforts to fine-tune regulations in BC’s prawn fishery have led to an ever expanding spiral of costly, clumsy, and intrusive regulations, enforcement, and related procedures that dissipate resource rents, frustrate fishers, and ultimately are ineffective in protecting the resource and/or the associated jobs. The best way out of this morass appears to be for managers of sedentary species to confine their efforts to macro-management regulations that focus on limiting the consequences of fishing and ensuring that individual fishers endure the consequences of their actions. Close

• 5. [Article] Institutional Changes to Fisheries Management Systems Caused by the TAC in Japan

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Institutional Changes to Fisheries Management Systems Caused by the TAC in Japan Author: Hidaka, Takeshi Research Paper Title: Institutional Changes to Fisheries Management Systems Caused by the TAC in Japan Author: Hidaka, Takeshi Research Paper Close

• 6. [Article] Important Factors Influencing Rule Compliance in Fisheries Lessons from Danish Fisheries

  This paper presents the results of a research project, which has focused on Danish fishers’ acceptance of imposed fisheries regulations and their respect for the management system. The analytical framework ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Important Factors Influencing Rule Compliance in Fisheries Lessons from Danish Fisheries Author: Mathiesen, Christoph, Nielsen, Jesper Raakjaer Year: 2001 This paper presents the results of a research project, which has focused on Danish fishers’ acceptance of imposed fisheries regulations and their respect for the management system. The analytical framework developed by Raakjær Nielsen (1998) and Raakjær Nielsen and Vedsmand (1999) has been used. The research has focused on three Danish fisheries: the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea, the demersal and Nephrops fishery in Kattegat and the fishery for non-human consumption species in the North Sea. The research is based on interviews with 56 fishers and a mail survey covering all vessels in the three selected fisheries. The following factors are concluded to have a major impact on rule compliance in fisheries: 1) the economic gains to be obtained; 2) the risk of being detected and the severity of the sanction; 3) the compatibility between the content of the regulation and the fishing patterns and practise; 4) regulation leads towards stock conservation; 5) norms, in particular the behaviour of other fishers and the moral of the individual fisher. In addition there are some indication, that co-management is important for rule compliance. Title: Important Factors Influencing Rule Compliance in Fisheries Lessons from Danish Fisheries Author: Mathiesen, Christoph, Nielsen, Jesper Raakjaer Year: 2001 This paper presents the results of a research project, which has focused on Danish fishers’ acceptance of imposed fisheries regulations and their respect for the management system. The analytical framework developed by Raakjær Nielsen (1998) and Raakjær Nielsen and Vedsmand (1999) has been used. The research has focused on three Danish fisheries: the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea, the demersal and Nephrops fishery in Kattegat and the fishery for non-human consumption species in the North Sea. The research is based on interviews with 56 fishers and a mail survey covering all vessels in the three selected fisheries. The following factors are concluded to have a major impact on rule compliance in fisheries: 1) the economic gains to be obtained; 2) the risk of being detected and the severity of the sanction; 3) the compatibility between the content of the regulation and the fishing patterns and practise; 4) regulation leads towards stock conservation; 5) norms, in particular the behaviour of other fishers and the moral of the individual fisher. In addition there are some indication, that co-management is important for rule compliance. Close

• 7. [Article] Fisheries Management and Rule of Law

  Fishing is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the U.S. economy. Theoretically, regulating an industry means subjecting it to the rule of law: treating those with an interest in the resource ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Fisheries Management and Rule of Law Author: McEvoy, Arthur F. Year: 2001 Fishing is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the U.S. economy. Theoretically, regulating an industry means subjecting it to the rule of law: treating those with an interest in the resource fairly while preserving the public interest in public order, economic efficiency, and conservation. There are, however, two opposing concepts of “rule of law,” each with deep roots in U.S. legal culture, that conflict with each other and frequently stymie efforts to regulate fisheries successfully. One of these concepts is the classical liberal idea of autonomy, which stresses the individual’s right to pursue his/her self-interest free of state interference. Rule of law here means that the state should guarantee private ordering, treat everyone alike, and promote private enterprise. The other is the Jeffersonian, or republican, idea of participation, which stresses the equal participation of all citizens in self-government. Throughout U.S. history, these two norms have co-existed uncomfortably with each other as sources of legitimacy for regulatory regimes. Liberal thinking predominated in the nineteenth century, although it clearly underlies limited-entry and other property-oriented regimes today. Republican thinking has emerged more recently in co-management regimes that stress the participation of user groups in data-gathering, policymaking, and enforcement. Somewhere in between is the New Deal style of governance, on which the Magnuson Act of 1976 is based. Title: Fisheries Management and Rule of Law Author: McEvoy, Arthur F. Year: 2001 Fishing is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the U.S. economy. Theoretically, regulating an industry means subjecting it to the rule of law: treating those with an interest in the resource fairly while preserving the public interest in public order, economic efficiency, and conservation. There are, however, two opposing concepts of “rule of law,” each with deep roots in U.S. legal culture, that conflict with each other and frequently stymie efforts to regulate fisheries successfully. One of these concepts is the classical liberal idea of autonomy, which stresses the individual’s right to pursue his/her self-interest free of state interference. Rule of law here means that the state should guarantee private ordering, treat everyone alike, and promote private enterprise. The other is the Jeffersonian, or republican, idea of participation, which stresses the equal participation of all citizens in self-government. Throughout U.S. history, these two norms have co-existed uncomfortably with each other as sources of legitimacy for regulatory regimes. Liberal thinking predominated in the nineteenth century, although it clearly underlies limited-entry and other property-oriented regimes today. Republican thinking has emerged more recently in co-management regimes that stress the participation of user groups in data-gathering, policymaking, and enforcement. Somewhere in between is the New Deal style of governance, on which the Magnuson Act of 1976 is based. Close

• 8. [Article] Cleaning of Eutrophic Inland Waters for Fishery and Amenities: On the Treatment of Dynamic Aspects in Political Economy Modelling of Statutory Regulations in Polluting Communities

  Due to the immanent common property problem of water, non-point-pollution is the common feature of many inland waters and the eutrophic levels are alarmingly high. drinking water and other services are ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Cleaning of Eutrophic Inland Waters for Fishery and Amenities: On the Treatment of Dynamic Aspects in Political Economy Modelling of Statutory Regulations in Polluting Communities Author: Nuppenau, Ernst-August Year: 2001 Due to the immanent common property problem of water, non-point-pollution is the common feature of many inland waters and the eutrophic levels are alarmingly high. drinking water and other services are negatively affected by high eutrophic levels fisheries. Concerning causes of pollution, agriculture, subject to overuse of fertilizer and pesticides, is regarded as the main polluter. Environmental regulations on farm practices, such as animal waste and fertilizer application, seek to minimize shocks imposed by eutrophying substances. Since many waters already show high concentrations of these substances, even cleaning is needed. In the dynamic context of eutrophication, which results from multiple polluters and is accumulated over time, damage to water quality depends on stocks and flows of pollutants. The paper presents a model that counts for limitation of inflows and attributed levels of farm activity to pollution. The paper applies a combination of dynamic control and political economy models, optimized by a manager of a common property, a clean lake, a river or, more generally, an interconnected watershed. It seeks to achieve an agreed level of cleanness or eutrophic levels of water on behalf of a community. A political economy model depicts the bargaining process for the establishment of an objective function of the community. The manager is a partial manager, not a benevolent dictator, but has statutory power to regulate fertilizer application on lake shores and alleviate eutrophication with nutrients. Benefits are purified waters that benefit all members, including fishermen. As institutions, the approach investigates the tragedy of the commons and statutory regulations. Financial innovations for compensation are also possible. Title: Cleaning of Eutrophic Inland Waters for Fishery and Amenities: On the Treatment of Dynamic Aspects in Political Economy Modelling of Statutory Regulations in Polluting Communities Author: Nuppenau, Ernst-August Year: 2001 Due to the immanent common property problem of water, non-point-pollution is the common feature of many inland waters and the eutrophic levels are alarmingly high. drinking water and other services are negatively affected by high eutrophic levels fisheries. Concerning causes of pollution, agriculture, subject to overuse of fertilizer and pesticides, is regarded as the main polluter. Environmental regulations on farm practices, such as animal waste and fertilizer application, seek to minimize shocks imposed by eutrophying substances. Since many waters already show high concentrations of these substances, even cleaning is needed. In the dynamic context of eutrophication, which results from multiple polluters and is accumulated over time, damage to water quality depends on stocks and flows of pollutants. The paper presents a model that counts for limitation of inflows and attributed levels of farm activity to pollution. The paper applies a combination of dynamic control and political economy models, optimized by a manager of a common property, a clean lake, a river or, more generally, an interconnected watershed. It seeks to achieve an agreed level of cleanness or eutrophic levels of water on behalf of a community. A political economy model depicts the bargaining process for the establishment of an objective function of the community. The manager is a partial manager, not a benevolent dictator, but has statutory power to regulate fertilizer application on lake shores and alleviate eutrophication with nutrients. Benefits are purified waters that benefit all members, including fishermen. As institutions, the approach investigates the tragedy of the commons and statutory regulations. Financial innovations for compensation are also possible. Close

• 9. [Article] Management and Enforcement Costs in Norway's Fisheries

  This paper discusses public expenditures on fisheries in Norway. The purpose is to identify management and enforcement costs, management being defined as regulations necessary to overcome the open access ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Management and Enforcement Costs in Norway's Fisheries Author: Hannesson, Rognvaldur Year: 2001 This paper discusses public expenditures on fisheries in Norway. The purpose is to identify management and enforcement costs, management being defined as regulations necessary to overcome the open access problem. Management costs thus include costs of devising and enforcing fisheries regulations. They also include stock assessments and monitoring at sea, but do not include research with a more academic orientation, search and rescue operations, and various infrastructure such as fishing harbors. The figures cover the period 1990-1999. The management costs amount to 7-13 percent of the catch value, a variation which is primarily due to the variability of the annual catch value. Total expenditures on the fisheries sector have been much higher in the past; in 1990-91 subsidies were more than 20 percent of the catch value but were down to approximately two percent in 1996-99. Title: Management and Enforcement Costs in Norway's Fisheries Author: Hannesson, Rognvaldur Year: 2001 This paper discusses public expenditures on fisheries in Norway. The purpose is to identify management and enforcement costs, management being defined as regulations necessary to overcome the open access problem. Management costs thus include costs of devising and enforcing fisheries regulations. They also include stock assessments and monitoring at sea, but do not include research with a more academic orientation, search and rescue operations, and various infrastructure such as fishing harbors. The figures cover the period 1990-1999. The management costs amount to 7-13 percent of the catch value, a variation which is primarily due to the variability of the annual catch value. Total expenditures on the fisheries sector have been much higher in the past; in 1990-91 subsidies were more than 20 percent of the catch value but were down to approximately two percent in 1996-99. Close

• 10. [Article] Tradable Effort Permits: A Case Study of the Florida Spiny Lobster Trap Certificate Program

  The Florida spiny lobster trap certificate program (TCP) is one of the oldest U.S. fisheries programs involving tradable effort permits. Under the TCP, fishers must own a certificate (and pay an associated ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Tradable Effort Permits: A Case Study of the Florida Spiny Lobster Trap Certificate Program Author: Larkin, Sherry L., Milon, J. Walter Year: 2001 The Florida spiny lobster trap certificate program (TCP) is one of the oldest U.S. fisheries programs involving tradable effort permits. Under the TCP, fishers must own a certificate (and pay an associated annual fee) for each trap used. The program was created in 1992 to address overcapitalization amid growing social conflict in the fishery due to open-access regulation. Consequently, the total number of certificates (effort) is periodically reduced. However, no terminal effort level was designated so an intense debate has developed over future reductions. A bioeconomic analysis revealed that the current effort level (which is 34% below the initial level) remains approximately three times higher than even the most liberal estimate of “optimal” effort (i.e., effort that would generate the maximum economic yield). An analysis of the certificate market also indicated that prices have not approached levels reflecting the net present value of rents at the optimal effort level. These results suggest that existing regulations have failed to achieve the potentially large economic surplus that could result from optimal management. Prior to the implementation of similar programs, resource managers may want to consider lessons learned from the TCP. First, the social and political forces created by granting harvest rights tend to accentuate the problems of contracting among heterogeneous participants. Second, the fee schedule and budgetary issues can affect the structure and performance of the transfer market. Lastly, an elusive social surplus may not be a sufficient reward to overcome social, economic, and regulatory impediments to economically optimal regulation. Title: Tradable Effort Permits: A Case Study of the Florida Spiny Lobster Trap Certificate Program Author: Larkin, Sherry L., Milon, J. Walter Year: 2001 The Florida spiny lobster trap certificate program (TCP) is one of the oldest U.S. fisheries programs involving tradable effort permits. Under the TCP, fishers must own a certificate (and pay an associated annual fee) for each trap used. The program was created in 1992 to address overcapitalization amid growing social conflict in the fishery due to open-access regulation. Consequently, the total number of certificates (effort) is periodically reduced. However, no terminal effort level was designated so an intense debate has developed over future reductions. A bioeconomic analysis revealed that the current effort level (which is 34% below the initial level) remains approximately three times higher than even the most liberal estimate of “optimal” effort (i.e., effort that would generate the maximum economic yield). An analysis of the certificate market also indicated that prices have not approached levels reflecting the net present value of rents at the optimal effort level. These results suggest that existing regulations have failed to achieve the potentially large economic surplus that could result from optimal management. Prior to the implementation of similar programs, resource managers may want to consider lessons learned from the TCP. First, the social and political forces created by granting harvest rights tend to accentuate the problems of contracting among heterogeneous participants. Second, the fee schedule and budgetary issues can affect the structure and performance of the transfer market. Lastly, an elusive social surplus may not be a sufficient reward to overcome social, economic, and regulatory impediments to economically optimal regulation. Close