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• 21. [Article] On Demand-side Approaches to Solving the "Tragedy of High Prices" in Fisheries

  While overfishing frequently is explained in terms of «the Tragedy of the Commons» model, it is argued that the economic causes of such long-run resource problems could be more accurately characterised ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: On Demand-side Approaches to Solving the "Tragedy of High Prices" in Fisheries Author: Valatin, Gregory Year: 2001 While overfishing frequently is explained in terms of «the Tragedy of the Commons» model, it is argued that the economic causes of such long-run resource problems could be more accurately characterised in terms of a «Tragedy of High Prices» due to landings prices exceeding fishing costs at the socially optimal level of resource use. In tackling over-exploitation problems, the feasibility and relative efficiency of demand-side measures in attaining management objectives without necessitating introduction of other fishing rights is discussed. Distributional issues associated with using a market mechanism to allocate use rights and potential adoption of demand-side measures within a co-management framework are considered. Despite apparently desirable properties, solutions based upon demand-side regulation have been much neglected in the literature, and rarely put into practice. Discussion of such systems provides a contribution towards the continuing debate regarding how best to improve fisheries management, to ensure that economic rents are neither purely dissipated, nor simply captured by a first generation of resource users. Title: On Demand-side Approaches to Solving the "Tragedy of High Prices" in Fisheries Author: Valatin, Gregory Year: 2001 While overfishing frequently is explained in terms of «the Tragedy of the Commons» model, it is argued that the economic causes of such long-run resource problems could be more accurately characterised in terms of a «Tragedy of High Prices» due to landings prices exceeding fishing costs at the socially optimal level of resource use. In tackling over-exploitation problems, the feasibility and relative efficiency of demand-side measures in attaining management objectives without necessitating introduction of other fishing rights is discussed. Distributional issues associated with using a market mechanism to allocate use rights and potential adoption of demand-side measures within a co-management framework are considered. Despite apparently desirable properties, solutions based upon demand-side regulation have been much neglected in the literature, and rarely put into practice. Discussion of such systems provides a contribution towards the continuing debate regarding how best to improve fisheries management, to ensure that economic rents are neither purely dissipated, nor simply captured by a first generation of resource users. Close

• 22. [Article] Development of effort and fishing fleet capacity in the Icelandic cod fishery

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Development of effort and fishing fleet capacity in the Icelandic cod fishery Author: Bergsson, Arnljotur Bjarki, Sigurdsson, Thorir, Gudmundsson, Eyjolfur Research Paper Title: Development of effort and fishing fleet capacity in the Icelandic cod fishery Author: Bergsson, Arnljotur Bjarki, Sigurdsson, Thorir, Gudmundsson, Eyjolfur Research Paper Close

• 23. [Article] The ecosystem approach and fisheries management institutions: the noble art of addressing complexity and uncertainty with all onboard and on a budget

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The ecosystem approach and fisheries management institutions: the noble art of addressing complexity and uncertainty with all onboard and on a budget Author: Degnbol, Poul Research Paper Title: The ecosystem approach and fisheries management institutions: the noble art of addressing complexity and uncertainty with all onboard and on a budget Author: Degnbol, Poul Research Paper Close

• 24. [Article] Improving the exploitation pattern in the fishery for Northeast Arctic Saithe (Pollachius virens)

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Improving the exploitation pattern in the fishery for Northeast Arctic Saithe (Pollachius virens) Author: Sandberg, Per, Nedreaas, Kjell Harald Research Paper Title: Improving the exploitation pattern in the fishery for Northeast Arctic Saithe (Pollachius virens) Author: Sandberg, Per, Nedreaas, Kjell Harald Research Paper Close

• 25. [Article] Implementing Change in Fisheries Management: Principles and Case Study

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Implementing Change in Fisheries Management: Principles and Case Study Author: Gibbs, Andrew, Fernyhough, Paul, Shallard, Bruce, Cashmore, David Research Paper Title: Implementing Change in Fisheries Management: Principles and Case Study Author: Gibbs, Andrew, Fernyhough, Paul, Shallard, Bruce, Cashmore, David Research Paper Close

• 26. [Article] The Peruvian Anchovy Sector: Costs and Benefits. An analysis of recent behavior and future challenges

  The paper analyzes the recent behavior of the Peruvian Anchoveta Sector, the largest single stock fishery in the world. It describes the different phases of boom and contraction that it has undergone since ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Peruvian Anchovy Sector: Costs and Benefits. An analysis of recent behavior and future challenges Author: Gutierrez, Maria E., Paredes, Carlos E. The paper analyzes the recent behavior of the Peruvian Anchoveta Sector, the largest single stock fishery in the world. It describes the different phases of boom and contraction that it has undergone since the 1960s, and how the lack of adequate regulation allowed –and even fostered– over-investment in the sector during the past 20 years. The unsurprising consequence of this policy regime is that the current size of both the fishing fleet and the processing plants is grossly oversized. Indeed, excess fleet capacity could be in the neighborhood of 60-70%, while the excess processing capacity of the plants is even more dramatic (between 65% and 80%). The economic costs entailed by this excess capacity are discussed in the paper. Estimates of resource rent loss using a modified version of the Excel program developed for such a purpose within the framework of the World Bank / FAO’s “Rent Drain” project are presented. This version allows the estimation of rent loss accruing from the fleet’s excess capacity (and ensuing large fixed costs). Using detailed cost structures for fleet and plants, the paper estimates that current aggregate foregone profits amount to US$400 million per year. The last section of the paper identifies and discusses a series of policy options and challenges for reform in the near future, including the adoption of ITQs and institutional change to deal with corruption. Title: The Peruvian Anchovy Sector: Costs and Benefits. An analysis of recent behavior and future challenges Author: Gutierrez, Maria E., Paredes, Carlos E. The paper analyzes the recent behavior of the Peruvian Anchoveta Sector, the largest single stock fishery in the world. It describes the different phases of boom and contraction that it has undergone since the 1960s, and how the lack of adequate regulation allowed –and even fostered– over-investment in the sector during the past 20 years. The unsurprising consequence of this policy regime is that the current size of both the fishing fleet and the processing plants is grossly oversized. Indeed, excess fleet capacity could be in the neighborhood of 60-70%, while the excess processing capacity of the plants is even more dramatic (between 65% and 80%). The economic costs entailed by this excess capacity are discussed in the paper. Estimates of resource rent loss using a modified version of the Excel program developed for such a purpose within the framework of the World Bank / FAO’s “Rent Drain” project are presented. This version allows the estimation of rent loss accruing from the fleet’s excess capacity (and ensuing large fixed costs). Using detailed cost structures for fleet and plants, the paper estimates that current aggregate foregone profits amount to US$400 million per year. The last section of the paper identifies and discusses a series of policy options and challenges for reform in the near future, including the adoption of ITQs and institutional change to deal with corruption. Close

• 27. [Article] Norway and Fisheries Globalisation: Challenges and Policy Priorities

  Norway is probably among the most obvious beneficiaries of globalisation, mainly because of the rich natural resources, skilled labour, advanced technology products and strong institutions. The fishing ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Norway and Fisheries Globalisation: Challenges and Policy Priorities Author: Johansen, Sverre, Vartdal, Kjersti Norway is probably among the most obvious beneficiaries of globalisation, mainly because of the rich natural resources, skilled labour, advanced technology products and strong institutions. The fishing industry has been on the forefront in adjusting to new challenges and seeking the potential gains of economic integration, liberalisation and deregulation. The international orientation and exposure to fluctuations and rapid change have been key features of the industry for centuries, mainly due to extensive export and trade. Consequently the fishing industry is well accustomed to the drivers and forces of globalisation. The national windfall benefits arising from globalisation do however add further pressure on the fishing industry in terms of continuous efficiency improvements, cost increases and greater competition. Given the limited nature of fisheries resources, regulation is a prerequisite to ensure sustainability, economic rents and national policy objectives. On the other hand the regulatory set-up should take into account the gains which arise from deregulation and greater flexibility, and empower the industry to maintain its competitiveness. Evidently both industry and government are faced with risks and challenges and the key concern is how to cope with these while at the same time reaping the benefits. Within the context of fisheries globalisation issues like global governance and enforcement, IUU-fishing, level playing field, market access, food prices, foreign investments, relocation and fragmentation of production carry great importance. This paper explores the key challenges to the management of fisheries and how they are addressed through Norwegian policy priorities. Title: Norway and Fisheries Globalisation: Challenges and Policy Priorities Author: Johansen, Sverre, Vartdal, Kjersti Norway is probably among the most obvious beneficiaries of globalisation, mainly because of the rich natural resources, skilled labour, advanced technology products and strong institutions. The fishing industry has been on the forefront in adjusting to new challenges and seeking the potential gains of economic integration, liberalisation and deregulation. The international orientation and exposure to fluctuations and rapid change have been key features of the industry for centuries, mainly due to extensive export and trade. Consequently the fishing industry is well accustomed to the drivers and forces of globalisation. The national windfall benefits arising from globalisation do however add further pressure on the fishing industry in terms of continuous efficiency improvements, cost increases and greater competition. Given the limited nature of fisheries resources, regulation is a prerequisite to ensure sustainability, economic rents and national policy objectives. On the other hand the regulatory set-up should take into account the gains which arise from deregulation and greater flexibility, and empower the industry to maintain its competitiveness. Evidently both industry and government are faced with risks and challenges and the key concern is how to cope with these while at the same time reaping the benefits. Within the context of fisheries globalisation issues like global governance and enforcement, IUU-fishing, level playing field, market access, food prices, foreign investments, relocation and fragmentation of production carry great importance. This paper explores the key challenges to the management of fisheries and how they are addressed through Norwegian policy priorities. Close

• 28. [Article] The Effectiveness of a Halibut Excluder Device and Consideration of Tradeoffs in Its Application

  Though the commercial value per pound of Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) is greater than that of most target species in trawl fisheries off Alaska, halibut retention is prohibited for trawlers ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Effectiveness of a Halibut Excluder Device and Consideration of Tradeoffs in Its Application Author: Gauvin, John R., Rose, Craig S. Year: 2001 Though the commercial value per pound of Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) is greater than that of most target species in trawl fisheries off Alaska, halibut retention is prohibited for trawlers and individual groundfish target trawl fisheries are subject to closure if they attain either their seasonal or annual limit of allowed halibut bycatch mortality. Although all groundfish fisheries catch considerable amounts of halibut as bycatch, only longline fishermen holding quota share in the individual fishing quota (IFQ) program are allowed to retain halibut in the federally managed fisheries off Alaska. To avoid catching halibut, trawl fishermen voluntarily developed a rigid grate system and escape panel which are installed ahead of the trawl “codend”. The bycatch reduction device was then formally tested by an industry trade association in conjunction with a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) fishing gear researcher under an Experimental Fishing Permit in 1998. Results from the experiment showed the device excluded 94% of the halibut while only releasing 38% of the target flatfish. Linear simulations of the fishery were developed to estimate the potential benefit of the grate. Results indicated that fleet-wide use of the grate would result in a 171% increase in the duration of the fishery, a 61% increase in target flatfish catch, and a 71% reduction in overall halibut bycatch. Other simulations demonstrated a high incentive for individual noncompliance. Factors affecting incentives for voluntary or regulatory use of bycatch reduction devices are explored in detail within the context of the highly regulated flatfish fisheries under federal management off Alaska. Title: The Effectiveness of a Halibut Excluder Device and Consideration of Tradeoffs in Its Application Author: Gauvin, John R., Rose, Craig S. Year: 2001 Though the commercial value per pound of Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) is greater than that of most target species in trawl fisheries off Alaska, halibut retention is prohibited for trawlers and individual groundfish target trawl fisheries are subject to closure if they attain either their seasonal or annual limit of allowed halibut bycatch mortality. Although all groundfish fisheries catch considerable amounts of halibut as bycatch, only longline fishermen holding quota share in the individual fishing quota (IFQ) program are allowed to retain halibut in the federally managed fisheries off Alaska. To avoid catching halibut, trawl fishermen voluntarily developed a rigid grate system and escape panel which are installed ahead of the trawl “codend”. The bycatch reduction device was then formally tested by an industry trade association in conjunction with a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) fishing gear researcher under an Experimental Fishing Permit in 1998. Results from the experiment showed the device excluded 94% of the halibut while only releasing 38% of the target flatfish. Linear simulations of the fishery were developed to estimate the potential benefit of the grate. Results indicated that fleet-wide use of the grate would result in a 171% increase in the duration of the fishery, a 61% increase in target flatfish catch, and a 71% reduction in overall halibut bycatch. Other simulations demonstrated a high incentive for individual noncompliance. Factors affecting incentives for voluntary or regulatory use of bycatch reduction devices are explored in detail within the context of the highly regulated flatfish fisheries under federal management off Alaska. Close

• 29. [Article] Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries

  The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries Author: Matthiasson, Thorolfur Year: 2001 The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. Icelandic politicians have used much of their time and effort during the fourth quarter of the 20. century to debate how to organise the utilisation of the resource and in what way one should distribute the rents from its harvesting. In the paper give a short account of the development of the regulatory reforms in four types of Icelandic fisheries. No one of the reformatory processes can be said to be a replica of the any of the other processes. It seems evident at the face of things that each reformatory process is unique and distinct from the other except for the final outcome, the rule of the ITQs. But that may seem to be to short sighted conclusion. It should be evident from the earliest history of regulatory reforms that the ITQ system was not the intentional outcome. It came to be, eventually. There is a common pattern for all the fisheries, however. First of all: The serious attempts to reform the management practise starts first when the fishery has collapsed or is close to a collapse. Secondly, the first thing that stake holders seem to get done is to close the club that has access to the given fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules was used to allocate participation rights when the club of participants had been closed. Fourthly, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland prior to the invention of the ITQ system. Lastly, management of fisheries by ITQs rather than some form of taxes or fees may have historical rather than logical roots. Title: Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries Author: Matthiasson, Thorolfur Year: 2001 The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. Icelandic politicians have used much of their time and effort during the fourth quarter of the 20. century to debate how to organise the utilisation of the resource and in what way one should distribute the rents from its harvesting. In the paper give a short account of the development of the regulatory reforms in four types of Icelandic fisheries. No one of the reformatory processes can be said to be a replica of the any of the other processes. It seems evident at the face of things that each reformatory process is unique and distinct from the other except for the final outcome, the rule of the ITQs. But that may seem to be to short sighted conclusion. It should be evident from the earliest history of regulatory reforms that the ITQ system was not the intentional outcome. It came to be, eventually. There is a common pattern for all the fisheries, however. First of all: The serious attempts to reform the management practise starts first when the fishery has collapsed or is close to a collapse. Secondly, the first thing that stake holders seem to get done is to close the club that has access to the given fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules was used to allocate participation rights when the club of participants had been closed. Fourthly, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland prior to the invention of the ITQ system. Lastly, management of fisheries by ITQs rather than some form of taxes or fees may have historical rather than logical roots. Close

• 30. [Article] Comment on “Landing Fees versus Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks.”

  In “Landing fees vs. harvest quotas with uncertain fish stocks”, Martin Weitzman maintains that the conventional view among both fisheries economists and fisheries managers is that “prices” are inferior ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Comment on “Landing Fees versus Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks.” Author: Jaeger, William K. Year: 2001 In “Landing fees vs. harvest quotas with uncertain fish stocks”, Martin Weitzman maintains that the conventional view among both fisheries economists and fisheries managers is that “prices” are inferior to “quantities” as instruments for regulating the fishing industry. Weitzman takes the opposite position, appealing to two well-established ideas in economics: 1) his own seminal insight on “prices vs. quantities”(Weitzman 1974), and 2) the “powerful general theme in economics that a ‘price signal’ can compress into a simple reduced form all relevant information for inducing correct decentralized decisions.” His paper is an attempt to capture and formalize his intuition on the subject using a standard dynamic fishery model with a stochastic stock-recruitment relation which introduces uncertainty, and evaluating the performance of both landing fees and harvest quotas in comparison to a hypothetical “perfect-information” optimal solution. The basic model is a well-known type which gives rise to a “bang-bang” optimal escapement target, S*. Weitzman rigorously solves the optimizing fishery manager’s dynamic programming problem for each management regime, and shows that the result for a constant landing fee (corresponding to S*) is identical to the “perfect-information” solution, but that both are superior to the harvest quota. This result is undoubtedly correct for the models being appraised. The basis for this finding is less clear, however, since the assumptions which have given rise to this result are not explicitly identified. Indeed, on closer examination, the source of these striking results appears to be unrelated to “prices vs. quantities” in the classic sense. Furthermore, the theme in economics that a ‘price signal’ can compress information and induce correct decentralized decisions appears to be unrelated since there are no differentiated decentralized decisions to be made in the model. Title: Comment on “Landing Fees versus Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks.” Author: Jaeger, William K. Year: 2001 In “Landing fees vs. harvest quotas with uncertain fish stocks”, Martin Weitzman maintains that the conventional view among both fisheries economists and fisheries managers is that “prices” are inferior to “quantities” as instruments for regulating the fishing industry. Weitzman takes the opposite position, appealing to two well-established ideas in economics: 1) his own seminal insight on “prices vs. quantities”(Weitzman 1974), and 2) the “powerful general theme in economics that a ‘price signal’ can compress into a simple reduced form all relevant information for inducing correct decentralized decisions.” His paper is an attempt to capture and formalize his intuition on the subject using a standard dynamic fishery model with a stochastic stock-recruitment relation which introduces uncertainty, and evaluating the performance of both landing fees and harvest quotas in comparison to a hypothetical “perfect-information” optimal solution. The basic model is a well-known type which gives rise to a “bang-bang” optimal escapement target, S*. Weitzman rigorously solves the optimizing fishery manager’s dynamic programming problem for each management regime, and shows that the result for a constant landing fee (corresponding to S*) is identical to the “perfect-information” solution, but that both are superior to the harvest quota. This result is undoubtedly correct for the models being appraised. The basis for this finding is less clear, however, since the assumptions which have given rise to this result are not explicitly identified. Indeed, on closer examination, the source of these striking results appears to be unrelated to “prices vs. quantities” in the classic sense. Furthermore, the theme in economics that a ‘price signal’ can compress information and induce correct decentralized decisions appears to be unrelated since there are no differentiated decentralized decisions to be made in the model. Close