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• 1. [Article] Trade in Fishing Services

  Almost one half of the EEZs of the world are subject to so-called foreign fishing arrangements (FFAs), in which foreign fishing states (distant water fishing states in particular) gain access to EEZs under ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Trade in Fishing Services Author: Cunningham, Steve, Munro, Gordon Almost one half of the EEZs of the world are subject to so-called foreign fishing arrangements (FFAs), in which foreign fishing states (distant water fishing states in particular) gain access to EEZs under access arrangements with the relevant coastal states. The FFAs may take the form of “fee fishing” arrangements, joint ventures or charter arrangements. The World Bank undertook a project on FFAs, with particular reference to developing coastal states and launched the resultant project report in December 2014. The report includes a set of case studies, an important one of which is focused on the Bering Sea Pollock fishery. This paper presents an overview of the key findings of the report, including the legal obligations of coastal states concerning FFAs, and the conditions under which the rational coastal state will, or will not, welcome such arrangements. It is argued that coastal states entering into FFAs are properly to be seen as importing harvesting and/or processing and/or marketing services – hence the title of the report: Trade in Fishing Services. Trade in these services, it is argued, constitutes an important, but hitherto largely ignored, component of fisheries international trade. The economics required for the study of FFAs is thus a blend of fisheries economics, international economics, along with principal-agent analysis. Title: Trade in Fishing Services Author: Cunningham, Steve, Munro, Gordon Almost one half of the EEZs of the world are subject to so-called foreign fishing arrangements (FFAs), in which foreign fishing states (distant water fishing states in particular) gain access to EEZs under access arrangements with the relevant coastal states. The FFAs may take the form of “fee fishing” arrangements, joint ventures or charter arrangements. The World Bank undertook a project on FFAs, with particular reference to developing coastal states and launched the resultant project report in December 2014. The report includes a set of case studies, an important one of which is focused on the Bering Sea Pollock fishery. This paper presents an overview of the key findings of the report, including the legal obligations of coastal states concerning FFAs, and the conditions under which the rational coastal state will, or will not, welcome such arrangements. It is argued that coastal states entering into FFAs are properly to be seen as importing harvesting and/or processing and/or marketing services – hence the title of the report: Trade in Fishing Services. Trade in these services, it is argued, constitutes an important, but hitherto largely ignored, component of fisheries international trade. The economics required for the study of FFAs is thus a blend of fisheries economics, international economics, along with principal-agent analysis. Close

• 2. [Article] Diversification or Specialization: The Impact of U.S. West Coast Trawl Rationalization on Multiregional Fishery Participation and Effort

  "Rationalization” or the change to catch share management in fisheries has been shown to lead to the slowing of fishing activity, input and effort consolidation, cost savings, as well as new market and ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Diversification or Specialization: The Impact of U.S. West Coast Trawl Rationalization on Multiregional Fishery Participation and Effort Author: Kasperski, Stephen, Hsueh, Lily "Rationalization” or the change to catch share management in fisheries has been shown to lead to the slowing of fishing activity, input and effort consolidation, cost savings, as well as new market and product development. The effects of rationalization on fishermen’s behavior become more complex when one accounts for the spillover effects that catch share programs can create in other fisheries and other regions. The possession of secure harvesting privileges in one catch share fishery allows quota shareholders to expand operations in other fisheries since their share of the catch share fishery is protected (a “diversification” effect). However, there is an opportunity cost related to the slowing of the rate of fishing, given that more time spent fishing in the catch share fishery means there will be less time available for fishing elsewhere. Therefore, it is possible that more efficient vessels may expand their operations and specialize in the catch share fishery leaving the selling/lessor vessels to specialize in another fishery and/or region (a “specialization” effect). Which outcome is more likely is an empirical question, which we address by examining the recently implemented U.S. West Coast Groundfish Trawl Catch Share Program. Newly available cost and earnings data, product revenues and prices, and biological stock data allow us to calculate the average marginal effect of changes in West Coast species total allowable catches, prices, and vessel costs on the expected number of days spent fishing in Alaska to quantify the spillover effects of West Coast trawl rationalization on fisheries in Alaska. Title: Diversification or Specialization: The Impact of U.S. West Coast Trawl Rationalization on Multiregional Fishery Participation and Effort Author: Kasperski, Stephen, Hsueh, Lily "Rationalization” or the change to catch share management in fisheries has been shown to lead to the slowing of fishing activity, input and effort consolidation, cost savings, as well as new market and product development. The effects of rationalization on fishermen’s behavior become more complex when one accounts for the spillover effects that catch share programs can create in other fisheries and other regions. The possession of secure harvesting privileges in one catch share fishery allows quota shareholders to expand operations in other fisheries since their share of the catch share fishery is protected (a “diversification” effect). However, there is an opportunity cost related to the slowing of the rate of fishing, given that more time spent fishing in the catch share fishery means there will be less time available for fishing elsewhere. Therefore, it is possible that more efficient vessels may expand their operations and specialize in the catch share fishery leaving the selling/lessor vessels to specialize in another fishery and/or region (a “specialization” effect). Which outcome is more likely is an empirical question, which we address by examining the recently implemented U.S. West Coast Groundfish Trawl Catch Share Program. Newly available cost and earnings data, product revenues and prices, and biological stock data allow us to calculate the average marginal effect of changes in West Coast species total allowable catches, prices, and vessel costs on the expected number of days spent fishing in Alaska to quantify the spillover effects of West Coast trawl rationalization on fisheries in Alaska. Close

• 3. [Article] On the Efficiency of Polish Fishing Fleets

  The Baltic fishery is managed under the European Union Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) which defines procedures for setting annual total allowable catches (TAC) for major commercially harvested species. ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: On the Efficiency of Polish Fishing Fleets Author: Münch, Angela, Hutniczak, Barbara The Baltic fishery is managed under the European Union Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) which defines procedures for setting annual total allowable catches (TAC) for major commercially harvested species. TACs are given as fixed shares to each member state by applying the principal of relative stability. Poland uses non-tradable individual vessel quotas (IVQ) in order to allocate their TACs within their fishery fleet. The lack of tradability of the IVQs as well as the long-term tradition in fishery slowed down an adaptation of the Polish fleets towards changing fish stocks in the Baltic. The resulting overcapacity motivated the Polish government to implement time-limited scrapping program (2009-2011) to create exit incentives. This paper analyzes the remaining post-buyback inefficiencies of the Polish fishing fleet looking at the production structure of major fleet segments. Logbook data of 2012 is used to estimate multi-output and multi-input distance function. Calculated (Morishima) elasticities of substitution are used to determine the flexibility of the fleet in terms of targetability and substitutability between inputs defined as on-site effective effort (E), capital (K) and the travel distance (R). Policy recommendations are derived to increase fleet efficiency besides the first-best solution of tradable quotas. Title: On the Efficiency of Polish Fishing Fleets Author: Münch, Angela, Hutniczak, Barbara The Baltic fishery is managed under the European Union Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) which defines procedures for setting annual total allowable catches (TAC) for major commercially harvested species. TACs are given as fixed shares to each member state by applying the principal of relative stability. Poland uses non-tradable individual vessel quotas (IVQ) in order to allocate their TACs within their fishery fleet. The lack of tradability of the IVQs as well as the long-term tradition in fishery slowed down an adaptation of the Polish fleets towards changing fish stocks in the Baltic. The resulting overcapacity motivated the Polish government to implement time-limited scrapping program (2009-2011) to create exit incentives. This paper analyzes the remaining post-buyback inefficiencies of the Polish fishing fleet looking at the production structure of major fleet segments. Logbook data of 2012 is used to estimate multi-output and multi-input distance function. Calculated (Morishima) elasticities of substitution are used to determine the flexibility of the fleet in terms of targetability and substitutability between inputs defined as on-site effective effort (E), capital (K) and the travel distance (R). Policy recommendations are derived to increase fleet efficiency besides the first-best solution of tradable quotas. Close

• 4. [Article] Experimental Analysis of Coordination of Fishing Effort to Reduce Dissipation of Economic Rent in Stock Enhancement

  Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems have been used to control harvests and increase fisheries’ economic efficiency; however, they do not eliminate competitive fishing which can result in stock ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Experimental Analysis of Coordination of Fishing Effort to Reduce Dissipation of Economic Rent in Stock Enhancement Author: León, Rafael, van Putten, Ingrid, Gardner, Caleb, Emery, Timothy, Tisdell, John, Hartmann, Klaas Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems have been used to control harvests and increase fisheries’ economic efficiency; however, they do not eliminate competitive fishing which can result in stock and congestion externalities that are especially apparent when resources are spatially heterogeneous within the controlled region of the ITQ system. These externalities arise because ITQ systems do not control the spatial distribution of effort leaving fishers to concentrate their effort in more profitable patches. We explored the potential for cooperative behavior to reduce this congestion using an experimental economics approach in the context of management of a stock enhancement program (SEP). Four treatments were applied involving different systems which were: compulsory, voluntary and by-use payment for the SEP, with either open or exclusive access to the enhanced zone (EZ). Income is either directly to individuals or split between participants through income-sharing (as occurs in cooperatives). Voluntary payment to fund the SEP enabled individuals to opt out of cooperation, which reduced the enhancement activity and led to a significantly lower cooperation than the optimal level and also lower relative to the compulsory payment system. Treatments that included a by-use payment combined with exclusive access to the EZ were most effective in preventing dissipation of economic rent. The different rule settings were affected by participants’ expectations of reciprocity, with greater involvement and thus production from the SEP amongst cooperative participants. Perceptions of vulnerability were also important, as more self-interested participants were more likely to exclude themselves from the SEP. The structure of rules may enable individuals who are more intrinsically cooperative to drive the fishery towards a state with low rent dissipation. Title: Experimental Analysis of Coordination of Fishing Effort to Reduce Dissipation of Economic Rent in Stock Enhancement Author: León, Rafael, van Putten, Ingrid, Gardner, Caleb, Emery, Timothy, Tisdell, John, Hartmann, Klaas Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems have been used to control harvests and increase fisheries’ economic efficiency; however, they do not eliminate competitive fishing which can result in stock and congestion externalities that are especially apparent when resources are spatially heterogeneous within the controlled region of the ITQ system. These externalities arise because ITQ systems do not control the spatial distribution of effort leaving fishers to concentrate their effort in more profitable patches. We explored the potential for cooperative behavior to reduce this congestion using an experimental economics approach in the context of management of a stock enhancement program (SEP). Four treatments were applied involving different systems which were: compulsory, voluntary and by-use payment for the SEP, with either open or exclusive access to the enhanced zone (EZ). Income is either directly to individuals or split between participants through income-sharing (as occurs in cooperatives). Voluntary payment to fund the SEP enabled individuals to opt out of cooperation, which reduced the enhancement activity and led to a significantly lower cooperation than the optimal level and also lower relative to the compulsory payment system. Treatments that included a by-use payment combined with exclusive access to the EZ were most effective in preventing dissipation of economic rent. The different rule settings were affected by participants’ expectations of reciprocity, with greater involvement and thus production from the SEP amongst cooperative participants. Perceptions of vulnerability were also important, as more self-interested participants were more likely to exclude themselves from the SEP. The structure of rules may enable individuals who are more intrinsically cooperative to drive the fishery towards a state with low rent dissipation. Close

• 5. [Article] The Anatomy of a Multispecies Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Market in Development

  In 2011 an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system was implemented for the limited entry trawl component of the Pacific groundfish fishery in the US. The IFQ system allocates quota shares (QS) for 29 IFQ ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Anatomy of a Multispecies Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Market in Development Author: Holland, Daniel S. In 2011 an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system was implemented for the limited entry trawl component of the Pacific groundfish fishery in the US. The IFQ system allocates quota shares (QS) for 29 IFQ stocks and individual bycatch quota (IBQ) shares for Pacific halibut. Each year quota shareholders are issued quota pounds (QP) which can be used to balance their own catches of IFQ species or can be traded. The complex multispecies nature of this fishery and the requirement to balance all catch with QP makes QP transferability a critical part of this IFQ system since fishermen have limited ability to control the species composition of their catch and may need to acquire QP to cover unplanned catch. Although a web-based system was created to enable QP transfers, this did not create a functional QP market automatically. Rather the market (and a variety of other mechanisms for distributing QP) is developing organically as quota holders, fishermen, and intermediaries develop trading and contractual relationships, and QP values are determined and evolve. I describe the structure of the QP market, how it has developed, and how it is performing. The analysis suggests that the market to date is thin and inefficient, and that this may be inhibiting utilization of fishery resources and profitability. I discuss the impediments to QP market efficiency and make recommendations on how more efficient multispecies markets might be facilitated in this and other multispecies IFQ fisheries. Title: The Anatomy of a Multispecies Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Market in Development Author: Holland, Daniel S. In 2011 an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system was implemented for the limited entry trawl component of the Pacific groundfish fishery in the US. The IFQ system allocates quota shares (QS) for 29 IFQ stocks and individual bycatch quota (IBQ) shares for Pacific halibut. Each year quota shareholders are issued quota pounds (QP) which can be used to balance their own catches of IFQ species or can be traded. The complex multispecies nature of this fishery and the requirement to balance all catch with QP makes QP transferability a critical part of this IFQ system since fishermen have limited ability to control the species composition of their catch and may need to acquire QP to cover unplanned catch. Although a web-based system was created to enable QP transfers, this did not create a functional QP market automatically. Rather the market (and a variety of other mechanisms for distributing QP) is developing organically as quota holders, fishermen, and intermediaries develop trading and contractual relationships, and QP values are determined and evolve. I describe the structure of the QP market, how it has developed, and how it is performing. The analysis suggests that the market to date is thin and inefficient, and that this may be inhibiting utilization of fishery resources and profitability. I discuss the impediments to QP market efficiency and make recommendations on how more efficient multispecies markets might be facilitated in this and other multispecies IFQ fisheries. Close

• 6. [Article] Evaluating the impact of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Red Snapper IFQ Trading

  During the first three years (2007-2009) of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program most quota lease trades were local, involving fishers that lived in the same communities. In 2010, the red snapper ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Evaluating the impact of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Red Snapper IFQ Trading Author: Ropicki, Andrew, Larkin, Sherry During the first three years (2007-2009) of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program most quota lease trades were local, involving fishers that lived in the same communities. In 2010, the red snapper quota lease market changed as more IFQ participants began trading quota with fishers from different regions of the Gulf. One possible cause of the change in trading was the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in April 2010, which led to widespread fishing closures in the northern Gulf of Mexico that lasted for much of the remainder of the year. Fishing closures led to some affected fishers looking to lease out their 2010 quota before it became worthless (non-harvested quota does not carry forward to future years); however, unlike in previous years where they would trade the quota locally they were forced to lease their quota to different areas of the Gulf since their neighbors were subject to the same fishery closures. This research compares IFQ trading data in the years prior to the spill (2007-2009) to 2010 trading data to determine how the oil spill impacted quota trading. Specifically, this analysis compares 2010 quota trading before and after the spill to the same periods in previous years to see if the spill changed the nature of quota trading. In addition, the analysis examines if new trading relationships created in the wake of the oil spill continued into future years. Title: Evaluating the impact of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Red Snapper IFQ Trading Author: Ropicki, Andrew, Larkin, Sherry During the first three years (2007-2009) of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program most quota lease trades were local, involving fishers that lived in the same communities. In 2010, the red snapper quota lease market changed as more IFQ participants began trading quota with fishers from different regions of the Gulf. One possible cause of the change in trading was the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in April 2010, which led to widespread fishing closures in the northern Gulf of Mexico that lasted for much of the remainder of the year. Fishing closures led to some affected fishers looking to lease out their 2010 quota before it became worthless (non-harvested quota does not carry forward to future years); however, unlike in previous years where they would trade the quota locally they were forced to lease their quota to different areas of the Gulf since their neighbors were subject to the same fishery closures. This research compares IFQ trading data in the years prior to the spill (2007-2009) to 2010 trading data to determine how the oil spill impacted quota trading. Specifically, this analysis compares 2010 quota trading before and after the spill to the same periods in previous years to see if the spill changed the nature of quota trading. In addition, the analysis examines if new trading relationships created in the wake of the oil spill continued into future years. Close

• 7. [Article] Caught up in Catch Shares: Regulations Matter

  Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been used in British Columbian fisheries management for more than 25 years. When they were implemented, few restrictions were placed on who could own or lease ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Caught up in Catch Shares: Regulations Matter Author: Sutcliffe, Tasha, Pepper-Smith, Kegan, Robertson, Andrea, Nobles, Des, McIssac, Jim, Fernandes, Devlin, Reid-Kuecks, Brenda Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been used in British Columbian fisheries management for more than 25 years. When they were implemented, few restrictions were placed on who could own or lease quota. As a result, many retiring fishermen retain quotas to lease or sell to processors and corporations rather than new entrants. Because new entrants are unable to compete with processor financing and have no mechanism to secure access to the resource, recruitment is near zero. Fishermen have become price takers, with related effects on the safety and stability of the industry. Most economic research has focused on the impacts of ITQs at a fleet wide scale. Our research dives deeper, exploring the effects on individual fishermen, particularly those in small boat fleets. Drawing on harvest, income, and socioeconomic data from the Government of Canada, interviews with fishermen, and published literature, our research demonstrates that ITQs have had a detrimental effect on many fishing enterprises, particularly new entrants. This deeper analysis of the system proves that despite producing more economically efficient fleets, there have been serious implications for BC’s remote coastal communities. Interactive data visualizations offer new perspectives on the issue, illustrating the rapid rise of consolidation in BC’s fishing fleets and the rapid loss of viable employment for many participants. By closely examining boat-level economics in tandem with on-the-ground interviews, this project humanizes the fishermen at the heart of the ITQ debate, giving voice to their perspectives, data to their circumstances, and highlighting opportunities for positive change in fisheries management. Title: Caught up in Catch Shares: Regulations Matter Author: Sutcliffe, Tasha, Pepper-Smith, Kegan, Robertson, Andrea, Nobles, Des, McIssac, Jim, Fernandes, Devlin, Reid-Kuecks, Brenda Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been used in British Columbian fisheries management for more than 25 years. When they were implemented, few restrictions were placed on who could own or lease quota. As a result, many retiring fishermen retain quotas to lease or sell to processors and corporations rather than new entrants. Because new entrants are unable to compete with processor financing and have no mechanism to secure access to the resource, recruitment is near zero. Fishermen have become price takers, with related effects on the safety and stability of the industry. Most economic research has focused on the impacts of ITQs at a fleet wide scale. Our research dives deeper, exploring the effects on individual fishermen, particularly those in small boat fleets. Drawing on harvest, income, and socioeconomic data from the Government of Canada, interviews with fishermen, and published literature, our research demonstrates that ITQs have had a detrimental effect on many fishing enterprises, particularly new entrants. This deeper analysis of the system proves that despite producing more economically efficient fleets, there have been serious implications for BC’s remote coastal communities. Interactive data visualizations offer new perspectives on the issue, illustrating the rapid rise of consolidation in BC’s fishing fleets and the rapid loss of viable employment for many participants. By closely examining boat-level economics in tandem with on-the-ground interviews, this project humanizes the fishermen at the heart of the ITQ debate, giving voice to their perspectives, data to their circumstances, and highlighting opportunities for positive change in fisheries management. Close

• 8. [Article] Distributional Effects of Quota Self-Governance by French Producer Cooperatives: The Case of the Bay of Biscay Sole Fishery

  Quota allocation mechanisms have distributional effects with important issues concerning the economic organization of the fishery and acceptability. Yet, these distributional effects are rarely studied. ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Distributional Effects of Quota Self-Governance by French Producer Cooperatives: The Case of the Bay of Biscay Sole Fishery Author: Bellanger, Manuel, Macher, Claire, Guyader, Olivier Quota allocation mechanisms have distributional effects with important issues concerning the economic organization of the fishery and acceptability. Yet, these distributional effects are rarely studied. In France, where fishing rights are not transferable, the quotas are shared between producer cooperatives based on the historical landings of their members. Each cooperative is then responsible for distributing its quotas to its members (i.e. pooling and redistribution). What are the distributional effects of the different quota management systems adopted by cooperatives on quotas and productions? The Bay of Biscay sole fishery is a good case study for investigating this question in the context of the EU Common Fishery Policy reform and the individualization of quota management by cooperatives as quotas become more constraining. This paper presents comparisons between (i) theoretical allocations by vessel based on historical landings; (ii) theoretical allocations according to cooperative quota management systems; (iii) actual landings observed. Concentration and inequality indicators were used to quantify and qualify distributional effects. Results showed that the various quota management systems among cooperatives have contrasting effects on vessels’ productions including benefits to the most sole-dependent vessels in some cooperatives and benefits to the small scale fisheries in other cooperatives. Title: Distributional Effects of Quota Self-Governance by French Producer Cooperatives: The Case of the Bay of Biscay Sole Fishery Author: Bellanger, Manuel, Macher, Claire, Guyader, Olivier Quota allocation mechanisms have distributional effects with important issues concerning the economic organization of the fishery and acceptability. Yet, these distributional effects are rarely studied. In France, where fishing rights are not transferable, the quotas are shared between producer cooperatives based on the historical landings of their members. Each cooperative is then responsible for distributing its quotas to its members (i.e. pooling and redistribution). What are the distributional effects of the different quota management systems adopted by cooperatives on quotas and productions? The Bay of Biscay sole fishery is a good case study for investigating this question in the context of the EU Common Fishery Policy reform and the individualization of quota management by cooperatives as quotas become more constraining. This paper presents comparisons between (i) theoretical allocations by vessel based on historical landings; (ii) theoretical allocations according to cooperative quota management systems; (iii) actual landings observed. Concentration and inequality indicators were used to quantify and qualify distributional effects. Results showed that the various quota management systems among cooperatives have contrasting effects on vessels’ productions including benefits to the most sole-dependent vessels in some cooperatives and benefits to the small scale fisheries in other cooperatives. Close

• 9. [Article] Evaluating the Impact of Rights-Based Fisheries Management: Evidence from the New England Groundfish Fishery

  Cooperatives in the Rights-based Fisheries Management have the potential to overcome some of the limitations of Individual Transferrable Quotas. The New England groundfish sector management, a new regime ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Evaluating the Impact of Rights-Based Fisheries Management: Evidence from the New England Groundfish Fishery Author: Huang, Ling, Ray, Subhash, Segerson, Kathleen, Walden, John Cooperatives in the Rights-based Fisheries Management have the potential to overcome some of the limitations of Individual Transferrable Quotas. The New England groundfish sector management, a new regime under which fishermen can voluntarily form sectors with each sector constrained by a total allowable catch or Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE), is a good example to examine the effectiveness of decentralized collectives. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the sector program on Technical Efficiency (TE), using detailed data at the vessel level. Combining Battese and Coelli (1995) and Caudill et al. (1995) to allow for maximum flexibility in modeling efficiency using a stochastic production frontier (SPF) method for the panel data, we compare TE before and after the program implementation. The results show that TE of New England groundfish fishery has improved 10.4% after sector management in 2010. The gains can be partially explained by restructuring of vessel composition since less efficient vessels exit and more efficient vessels stay. We also find that the average TE for the vessels that always stay across all years does increase by 9.8%, which cannot be simply explained by vessel structuring. Given the information, we explore other two mechanisms and find that after 2010, fishermen significantly specialize more in location choices, and vessels cooperate in choosing fishing locations in some sectors, but not in all of them. It turns out the impact of location specialization on TE is quite small. Title: Evaluating the Impact of Rights-Based Fisheries Management: Evidence from the New England Groundfish Fishery Author: Huang, Ling, Ray, Subhash, Segerson, Kathleen, Walden, John Cooperatives in the Rights-based Fisheries Management have the potential to overcome some of the limitations of Individual Transferrable Quotas. The New England groundfish sector management, a new regime under which fishermen can voluntarily form sectors with each sector constrained by a total allowable catch or Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE), is a good example to examine the effectiveness of decentralized collectives. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the sector program on Technical Efficiency (TE), using detailed data at the vessel level. Combining Battese and Coelli (1995) and Caudill et al. (1995) to allow for maximum flexibility in modeling efficiency using a stochastic production frontier (SPF) method for the panel data, we compare TE before and after the program implementation. The results show that TE of New England groundfish fishery has improved 10.4% after sector management in 2010. The gains can be partially explained by restructuring of vessel composition since less efficient vessels exit and more efficient vessels stay. We also find that the average TE for the vessels that always stay across all years does increase by 9.8%, which cannot be simply explained by vessel structuring. Given the information, we explore other two mechanisms and find that after 2010, fishermen significantly specialize more in location choices, and vessels cooperate in choosing fishing locations in some sectors, but not in all of them. It turns out the impact of location specialization on TE is quite small. Close

• 10. [Article] Assignment problems and economic rent dissipation in quota-managed fisheries

  Although some slides are unclear, this is the best available copy and has been submitted at the request of the authors.

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Assignment problems and economic rent dissipation in quota-managed fisheries Author: León, Rafael, Green, Bridget S., Gardner, Caleb, Tisdell, John, Emery, Timothy J., Hartmann, Klaas Although some slides are unclear, this is the best available copy and has been submitted at the request of the authors. Title: Assignment problems and economic rent dissipation in quota-managed fisheries Author: León, Rafael, Green, Bridget S., Gardner, Caleb, Tisdell, John, Emery, Timothy J., Hartmann, Klaas Although some slides are unclear, this is the best available copy and has been submitted at the request of the authors. Close