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• 11. [Image] Chapter 3 - Role of Water in the Syrian Economy

  	Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Chapter 3 - Role of Water in the Syrian Economy Author: Naff, Thomas Year: 1989 Title: Chapter 3 - Role of Water in the Syrian Economy Author: Naff, Thomas Year: 1989 Close

• 12. [Image] Figures speak for economy of modern and developed Syria under auspices of Ba'th Revolution

  	Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Figures speak for economy of modern and developed Syria under auspices of Ba'th Revolution Year: 1985 Title: Figures speak for economy of modern and developed Syria under auspices of Ba'th Revolution Year: 1985 Close

• 13. [Image] Economy

  	Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Economy Author: Nyrop, Richard F. Year: 1979 Title: Economy Author: Nyrop, Richard F. Year: 1979 Close

• 14. [Image] Economic Democracy and the Origins of the Israeli Labor Economy

  	Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Economic Democracy and the Origins of the Israeli Labor Economy Year: 1989 Title: Economic Democracy and the Origins of the Israeli Labor Economy Year: 1989 Close

• 15. [Article] Biotechnology and the Environment: Issues and Linkages

  The rapidity of change has left scant opportunity for investigation of the consequences of biotechnology adoption on long-term ecosystem or economic system functioning. Economic theory suggests that, if ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Biotechnology and the Environment: Issues and Linkages Author: Batie, Sandra S., Ervin, David E. Year: 1999 The rapidity of change has left scant opportunity for investigation of the consequences of biotechnology adoption on long-term ecosystem or economic system functioning. Economic theory suggests that, if the "Biotechnology Revolution" is left to market forces alone, there will be neglected public goods. Theory and limited empirical evidence suggests that there are significant incentives for private firms to discount and neglect negative environmental impacts and to develop products that meet only the needs of those able and willing to pay. Negative distributional impacts on rural societies and economies will not normally enter the private calculus nor will the long-term problems of insect and plant resistance. Furthermore, economists have shown the detrimental effects from excessive market power on prices, product quality and innovation. For example, the growing concentration in the biotechnology industry may dampen incentives to assure adequate diversity in plant germplasm. The authors suggest adoption of the precautionary approach in weighing the adoption of new agricultural biotechnologies. Title: Biotechnology and the Environment: Issues and Linkages Author: Batie, Sandra S., Ervin, David E. Year: 1999 The rapidity of change has left scant opportunity for investigation of the consequences of biotechnology adoption on long-term ecosystem or economic system functioning. Economic theory suggests that, if the "Biotechnology Revolution" is left to market forces alone, there will be neglected public goods. Theory and limited empirical evidence suggests that there are significant incentives for private firms to discount and neglect negative environmental impacts and to develop products that meet only the needs of those able and willing to pay. Negative distributional impacts on rural societies and economies will not normally enter the private calculus nor will the long-term problems of insect and plant resistance. Furthermore, economists have shown the detrimental effects from excessive market power on prices, product quality and innovation. For example, the growing concentration in the biotechnology industry may dampen incentives to assure adequate diversity in plant germplasm. The authors suggest adoption of the precautionary approach in weighing the adoption of new agricultural biotechnologies. Close

• 16. [Article] Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impacts of SB 1080 on Immigrant Groups

  In July 2008, the State of Oregon implemented SB 1080, legislation that required all applicants for an Oregon Driver License or ID card to present proof of legal presence in the United States. In 2007, ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impacts of SB 1080 on Immigrant Groups Author: King, Mary C., Corbett, John G., Chiappetta, John, López Salinas, Anabel Year: 2011 In July 2008, the State of Oregon implemented SB 1080, legislation that required all applicants for an Oregon Driver License or ID card to present proof of legal presence in the United States. In 2007, some 140,000 unauthorized immigrants were estimated to be living in Oregon, more than two-thirds of whom were estimated to be members of the labor force. Approximately 97% of Oregon’s unauthorized immigrants are thought to be Latino, nearly all of Mexican origin. This report includes a discussion of the social science findings on the situation of undocumented workers in the U.S and what is known about the uses of different forms of identification for Mexican nationals. It presents a statistical portrait of the Mexican-born population of Oregon, demonstrating their concentration in particular occupations, particularly agriculture, building and grounds maintenance, food preparation and construction. Given the magnitude of the ongoing recession, no economic impact of SB 1080 is yet discernible. In a full employment context, such as existed during 2007, and after all outstanding licenses held by undocumented immigrants have expired, SB 1080 might reduce state GDP by $160 million, or 0.1%, while raising wages by 0.16%. Economic impacts would be concentrated on those industries that particularly employ undocumented workers, notably agriculture and food service. Interviews with nearly 400 Spanish-speaking Oregon residents, conducted in the Summer of 2009, indicate distress and uncertainty in the Latino community, fear of deportation arising from a traffic stop, a significant number of people driving without a license and adjustments within households that reduce access to employment, education, medical and social services, church attendance and recreation. The full range and magnitudes of impacts cannot be known with certainty until SB 1080 is fully implemented in 2016, and the economy has recovered – and may be mitigated by immigration reform at the Federal level. Title: Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impacts of SB 1080 on Immigrant Groups Author: King, Mary C., Corbett, John G., Chiappetta, John, López Salinas, Anabel Year: 2011 In July 2008, the State of Oregon implemented SB 1080, legislation that required all applicants for an Oregon Driver License or ID card to present proof of legal presence in the United States. In 2007, some 140,000 unauthorized immigrants were estimated to be living in Oregon, more than two-thirds of whom were estimated to be members of the labor force. Approximately 97% of Oregon’s unauthorized immigrants are thought to be Latino, nearly all of Mexican origin. This report includes a discussion of the social science findings on the situation of undocumented workers in the U.S and what is known about the uses of different forms of identification for Mexican nationals. It presents a statistical portrait of the Mexican-born population of Oregon, demonstrating their concentration in particular occupations, particularly agriculture, building and grounds maintenance, food preparation and construction. Given the magnitude of the ongoing recession, no economic impact of SB 1080 is yet discernible. In a full employment context, such as existed during 2007, and after all outstanding licenses held by undocumented immigrants have expired, SB 1080 might reduce state GDP by $160 million, or 0.1%, while raising wages by 0.16%. Economic impacts would be concentrated on those industries that particularly employ undocumented workers, notably agriculture and food service. Interviews with nearly 400 Spanish-speaking Oregon residents, conducted in the Summer of 2009, indicate distress and uncertainty in the Latino community, fear of deportation arising from a traffic stop, a significant number of people driving without a license and adjustments within households that reduce access to employment, education, medical and social services, church attendance and recreation. The full range and magnitudes of impacts cannot be known with certainty until SB 1080 is fully implemented in 2016, and the economy has recovered – and may be mitigated by immigration reform at the Federal level. Close

• 17. [Article] The Effectiveness of Public Development Banks: Designing Good Impact Evaluations

  PDB programs have become a fundamental ingredient of productive development policy strategies in most emerging economies. Although the overall need for these interventions is rarely questioned, academics ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Effectiveness of Public Development Banks: Designing Good Impact Evaluations Author: Maffioli, Alessandro, Rodriguez, Cesar M. Year: 2013 PDB programs have become a fundamental ingredient of productive development policy strategies in most emerging economies. Although the overall need for these interventions is rarely questioned, academics and policymakers often debate their effectiveness, as well as the optimal approaches and instruments necessary to implement them. Therefore, the need to produce rigorous evaluations of PDBs has become increasingly relevant for both government and civil society (see Chapter 2). This chapter presents the main concepts and operational arguments regarding the execution of indepth impact evaluations of PDB initiatives and instruments. For a more practical approach, these arguments are presented with examples of such evaluations, which have either ended or are ongoing, as well as of other programs that relate to their activities. This, however, limits the scope of this chapter. First, only one key aspect of the evaluation process is included: the attribution of effects. This suggests that all the methods and techniques covered address the fundamental problem of identifying the causal relationship between public policy intervention and the observed changes in the study’s target population. Other important elements relating to a comprehensive evaluation process—such as efficiency, relevance, and institutional coherence—fall beyond the scope of this analysis. Second, only quantitative approaches are included, in order to solve the problem of attribution. This does not, in any way, imply that the contribution made by the qualitative approaches to the study of PDBs is not appreciated. On the contrary, quantitative and qualitative approaches are complementary, but much more exhaustive studies are required to include both. This chapter focuses mainly on the methodological literature based on counterfactual analysis, which stems from applying experimental and quasi-experimental methods to the evaluation of public policy. Interventions that are applicable to a PDB can cover a wider range of sectors than can be dealt with in one chapter alone. Therefore, the analysis and discussion in this chapter is restricted to those PDB initiatives that improve access to credit for the productive sector (business and agriculture). As such, it is possible to discuss more specific ideas and suggestions, while acknowledging that the complexity and characteristics of PDB programs call for more specific studies. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. It begins with a section posing the most important questions that are (or should be) included in any study of PDB effectiveness. The following section will identify the most commonly used indicators in these studies and the potential sources of information needed to establish such indicators. Later, the chapter analyzes the methods to respond to important questions relating to an evaluation, thus ensuring that the effects are correctly attributed. The final section explores the resources required to carry out a rigorous PDB evaluation. Title: The Effectiveness of Public Development Banks: Designing Good Impact Evaluations Author: Maffioli, Alessandro, Rodriguez, Cesar M. Year: 2013 PDB programs have become a fundamental ingredient of productive development policy strategies in most emerging economies. Although the overall need for these interventions is rarely questioned, academics and policymakers often debate their effectiveness, as well as the optimal approaches and instruments necessary to implement them. Therefore, the need to produce rigorous evaluations of PDBs has become increasingly relevant for both government and civil society (see Chapter 2). This chapter presents the main concepts and operational arguments regarding the execution of indepth impact evaluations of PDB initiatives and instruments. For a more practical approach, these arguments are presented with examples of such evaluations, which have either ended or are ongoing, as well as of other programs that relate to their activities. This, however, limits the scope of this chapter. First, only one key aspect of the evaluation process is included: the attribution of effects. This suggests that all the methods and techniques covered address the fundamental problem of identifying the causal relationship between public policy intervention and the observed changes in the study’s target population. Other important elements relating to a comprehensive evaluation process—such as efficiency, relevance, and institutional coherence—fall beyond the scope of this analysis. Second, only quantitative approaches are included, in order to solve the problem of attribution. This does not, in any way, imply that the contribution made by the qualitative approaches to the study of PDBs is not appreciated. On the contrary, quantitative and qualitative approaches are complementary, but much more exhaustive studies are required to include both. This chapter focuses mainly on the methodological literature based on counterfactual analysis, which stems from applying experimental and quasi-experimental methods to the evaluation of public policy. Interventions that are applicable to a PDB can cover a wider range of sectors than can be dealt with in one chapter alone. Therefore, the analysis and discussion in this chapter is restricted to those PDB initiatives that improve access to credit for the productive sector (business and agriculture). As such, it is possible to discuss more specific ideas and suggestions, while acknowledging that the complexity and characteristics of PDB programs call for more specific studies. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. It begins with a section posing the most important questions that are (or should be) included in any study of PDB effectiveness. The following section will identify the most commonly used indicators in these studies and the potential sources of information needed to establish such indicators. Later, the chapter analyzes the methods to respond to important questions relating to an evaluation, thus ensuring that the effects are correctly attributed. The final section explores the resources required to carry out a rigorous PDB evaluation. Close

• 18. [Article] Liability rules, transactions costs and optimum externality

  Economic theorists have proposed that the problems created by a Pareto-relevant externality may be solved by market transactions between the involved parties. These market transactions would allow realization ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Liability rules, transactions costs and optimum externality Author: Randall, Alan, 1944- Economic theorists have proposed that the problems created by a Pareto-relevant externality may be solved by market transactions between the involved parties. These market transactions would allow realization of the potential gains from trade which characterize a Pareto-relevant externality. After all potential gains from trade had been realized, a Pareto-efficient solution would, have been achieved. From the literature which has developed in the field, it is possible to distill two propositions which are here called the Weak and the Strong Coasian Hypotheses on Optimum Externality. These Hypotheses require certain assumptions: perfect competition in the markets for all factors and commodities; perfect information in a context of static certainty; secure and well defined property rights for all factors and commodities; and a well defined set of liability rules to serve as a starting point, or status quo point, for negotiations. The Weak Hypothesis states that "(m)arket transactions between individuals or firms involved in an externality situation will result in achievement of a Pareto-efficient solution, regardless of the initial liability rule." The Strong Hypothesis includes the Weak Hypothesis and adds that "(e)xactly the same equilibrium output of externality will be produced, regardless of the status quo liability rule." These Hypotheses are deductively tested, with the aid of simple mathematical models, for several different types of externality situations involving: producers only, consumers only and both producers and consumers; transactions costs equal to zero, and transactions costs greater than zero. For this deductive testing, the static perfect competition framework used in the original papers is retained. It is found that the Strong Hypothesis must be rejected for all cases except that where no consumers are involved, in the externality situation and variable transactions costs are zero. It is argued that situations meeting these criteria are most uncommon in practice, and so the Strong Hypothesis must be rejected for most practical situations. The Weak Hypothesis is not rejected, provided that all of the assumptions (including the crucial assumption of perfect competition in all relevant markets) are met. In situations where the Strong Hypothesis is rejected but the Weak Hypothesis is not, the equilibrium output of externality is different, under each different status quo liability rule. In this case, the selection of a status quo point can greatly affect the equilibrium output of externality, the distribution of income among involved parties and, if the status quo rule has wide application throughout the economy, the values of many other variables such as relative and absolute prices, aggregate consumption, production and investment and real income. Attention is drawn to the role of transactions costs in determining whether a solution can be obtained through market transactions between the involved parties. As the amount of variable transactions costs increases, the disparity between the solutions achieved under different status quo rules increases. Transactions costs are also likely to be greater than zero when some extra-market institutional framework is used to handle externality situations. It is argued that the size.and shape of the transactions cost curve under different institutions is an important variable to consider in institutional choice. Some directions for empirical research into the transactions cost curves are suggested. Title: Liability rules, transactions costs and optimum externality Author: Randall, Alan, 1944- Economic theorists have proposed that the problems created by a Pareto-relevant externality may be solved by market transactions between the involved parties. These market transactions would allow realization of the potential gains from trade which characterize a Pareto-relevant externality. After all potential gains from trade had been realized, a Pareto-efficient solution would, have been achieved. From the literature which has developed in the field, it is possible to distill two propositions which are here called the Weak and the Strong Coasian Hypotheses on Optimum Externality. These Hypotheses require certain assumptions: perfect competition in the markets for all factors and commodities; perfect information in a context of static certainty; secure and well defined property rights for all factors and commodities; and a well defined set of liability rules to serve as a starting point, or status quo point, for negotiations. The Weak Hypothesis states that "(m)arket transactions between individuals or firms involved in an externality situation will result in achievement of a Pareto-efficient solution, regardless of the initial liability rule." The Strong Hypothesis includes the Weak Hypothesis and adds that "(e)xactly the same equilibrium output of externality will be produced, regardless of the status quo liability rule." These Hypotheses are deductively tested, with the aid of simple mathematical models, for several different types of externality situations involving: producers only, consumers only and both producers and consumers; transactions costs equal to zero, and transactions costs greater than zero. For this deductive testing, the static perfect competition framework used in the original papers is retained. It is found that the Strong Hypothesis must be rejected for all cases except that where no consumers are involved, in the externality situation and variable transactions costs are zero. It is argued that situations meeting these criteria are most uncommon in practice, and so the Strong Hypothesis must be rejected for most practical situations. The Weak Hypothesis is not rejected, provided that all of the assumptions (including the crucial assumption of perfect competition in all relevant markets) are met. In situations where the Strong Hypothesis is rejected but the Weak Hypothesis is not, the equilibrium output of externality is different, under each different status quo liability rule. In this case, the selection of a status quo point can greatly affect the equilibrium output of externality, the distribution of income among involved parties and, if the status quo rule has wide application throughout the economy, the values of many other variables such as relative and absolute prices, aggregate consumption, production and investment and real income. Attention is drawn to the role of transactions costs in determining whether a solution can be obtained through market transactions between the involved parties. As the amount of variable transactions costs increases, the disparity between the solutions achieved under different status quo rules increases. Transactions costs are also likely to be greater than zero when some extra-market institutional framework is used to handle externality situations. It is argued that the size.and shape of the transactions cost curve under different institutions is an important variable to consider in institutional choice. Some directions for empirical research into the transactions cost curves are suggested. Close