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• 1. [Article] The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study

  Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study Author: Thebaud, Olivier Year: 2001 Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. The discussion of management measures implicitly assumes that an external intervention will be possible - usually by the State - either to regulate directly resource use, or to allocate and enforce private use rights in order for decentralised co-ordination systems to operate efficiently. At first sight, economic models developed to explain fisheries over-exploitation leave little hope for selfregulation to emerge from a competitive fishery. The paper focuses on the analytical issues underlying the on-going debate on the possibility for fisheries to be self-regulated. Based on the analysis of a historical case study - the development of management arrangements between whaling firms in the 1930ies and 1950-60ies - it shows that the absence of a central authority cannot be systematically associated to an absence of regulation, and explores some of the implications this has for the economic analysis of fisheries management. Title: The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study Author: Thebaud, Olivier Year: 2001 Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. The discussion of management measures implicitly assumes that an external intervention will be possible - usually by the State - either to regulate directly resource use, or to allocate and enforce private use rights in order for decentralised co-ordination systems to operate efficiently. At first sight, economic models developed to explain fisheries over-exploitation leave little hope for selfregulation to emerge from a competitive fishery. The paper focuses on the analytical issues underlying the on-going debate on the possibility for fisheries to be self-regulated. Based on the analysis of a historical case study - the development of management arrangements between whaling firms in the 1930ies and 1950-60ies - it shows that the absence of a central authority cannot be systematically associated to an absence of regulation, and explores some of the implications this has for the economic analysis of fisheries management. Close

• 2. [Article] Measuring economic depreciation in fisheries

  Abstract Only

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Measuring economic depreciation in fisheries Author: Thebaud, Olivier, Vieira, Simon, Pascoe, Sean Abstract Only Title: Measuring economic depreciation in fisheries Author: Thebaud, Olivier, Vieira, Simon, Pascoe, Sean Abstract Only Close

• 3. [Article] Missed Opportunity for a Golden Handshake? Why Did So Many Fishers Stay After the Introduction of ITQs?

  presentation

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Missed Opportunity for a Golden Handshake? Why Did So Many Fishers Stay After the Introduction of ITQs? Author: Frusher, Stewart, Thebaud, Olivier, Little, Rich, Hamon, Katell presentation Title: Missed Opportunity for a Golden Handshake? Why Did So Many Fishers Stay After the Introduction of ITQs? Author: Frusher, Stewart, Thebaud, Olivier, Little, Rich, Hamon, Katell presentation Close