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• 1. [Article] Comparing bookkeeping and field survey methods for assessing fishing fleets economic performance. A case study of Brittany fishing fleets (France)

  Research Paper

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Comparing bookkeeping and field survey methods for assessing fishing fleets economic performance. A case study of Brittany fishing fleets (France) Author: Thebaud, Olivier, Martin, Annaick, le Floc'h, Pascal, Boncoeur, Jean, Guyader, Olivier, Daures, Fabienne Research Paper Title: Comparing bookkeeping and field survey methods for assessing fishing fleets economic performance. A case study of Brittany fishing fleets (France) Author: Thebaud, Olivier, Martin, Annaick, le Floc'h, Pascal, Boncoeur, Jean, Guyader, Olivier, Daures, Fabienne Research Paper Close

• 2. [Article] Distributional Effects of Quota Self-Governance by French Producer Cooperatives: The Case of the Bay of Biscay Sole Fishery

  Quota allocation mechanisms have distributional effects with important issues concerning the economic organization of the fishery and acceptability. Yet, these distributional effects are rarely studied. ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Distributional Effects of Quota Self-Governance by French Producer Cooperatives: The Case of the Bay of Biscay Sole Fishery Author: Bellanger, Manuel, Macher, Claire, Guyader, Olivier Quota allocation mechanisms have distributional effects with important issues concerning the economic organization of the fishery and acceptability. Yet, these distributional effects are rarely studied. In France, where fishing rights are not transferable, the quotas are shared between producer cooperatives based on the historical landings of their members. Each cooperative is then responsible for distributing its quotas to its members (i.e. pooling and redistribution). What are the distributional effects of the different quota management systems adopted by cooperatives on quotas and productions? The Bay of Biscay sole fishery is a good case study for investigating this question in the context of the EU Common Fishery Policy reform and the individualization of quota management by cooperatives as quotas become more constraining. This paper presents comparisons between (i) theoretical allocations by vessel based on historical landings; (ii) theoretical allocations according to cooperative quota management systems; (iii) actual landings observed. Concentration and inequality indicators were used to quantify and qualify distributional effects. Results showed that the various quota management systems among cooperatives have contrasting effects on vessels’ productions including benefits to the most sole-dependent vessels in some cooperatives and benefits to the small scale fisheries in other cooperatives. Title: Distributional Effects of Quota Self-Governance by French Producer Cooperatives: The Case of the Bay of Biscay Sole Fishery Author: Bellanger, Manuel, Macher, Claire, Guyader, Olivier Quota allocation mechanisms have distributional effects with important issues concerning the economic organization of the fishery and acceptability. Yet, these distributional effects are rarely studied. In France, where fishing rights are not transferable, the quotas are shared between producer cooperatives based on the historical landings of their members. Each cooperative is then responsible for distributing its quotas to its members (i.e. pooling and redistribution). What are the distributional effects of the different quota management systems adopted by cooperatives on quotas and productions? The Bay of Biscay sole fishery is a good case study for investigating this question in the context of the EU Common Fishery Policy reform and the individualization of quota management by cooperatives as quotas become more constraining. This paper presents comparisons between (i) theoretical allocations by vessel based on historical landings; (ii) theoretical allocations according to cooperative quota management systems; (iii) actual landings observed. Concentration and inequality indicators were used to quantify and qualify distributional effects. Results showed that the various quota management systems among cooperatives have contrasting effects on vessels’ productions including benefits to the most sole-dependent vessels in some cooperatives and benefits to the small scale fisheries in other cooperatives. Close