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• 11. [Article] Climate, Uncertainty and the Pacific Salmon Treaty: Insights on the Harvest Management Game

  Pacific Salmon are anadromous fish that cross state and international boundaries in their oceanic migrations. Fish spawned in the rivers of one jurisdiction are vulnerable to harvest in other jurisdictions. ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Climate, Uncertainty and the Pacific Salmon Treaty: Insights on the Harvest Management Game Author: Munro, Gordon, Tyedmers, Peter, McKelvey, Robert, Miller, Kathleen Year: 2001 Pacific Salmon are anadromous fish that cross state and international boundaries in their oceanic migrations. Fish spawned in the rivers of one jurisdiction are vulnerable to harvest in other jurisdictions. The rocky history of attempts by the United States and Canada to cooperatively manage their respective salmon harvests suggests that environmental variability may complicate the management of such shared resources. In recent years, an extended breakdown in cooperation was fueled by strongly divergent trends in Alaskan and southern salmon abundance, and a consequent change in the balance of each nation s interceptions of salmon spawned in the other nation s rivers. While several natural and anthropogenic factors contributed to these trends, there is considerable evidence that changing ocean conditions played a significant role. The period of high productivity in Alaska contributed to increased Alaskan interceptions of B.C. salmon at a time when Pacific Northwest coho and chinook could least withstand retaliatory actions on the part of the Canadian fleet. Only recently, has the mounting crisis led to a fundamental shift in the approach taken by the two nations to determine their respective salmon-harvest shares. On June 30, 1999, Canada and the U.S. signed an agreement which, if successfully implemented, may lay the groundwork for a more sustainable cooperative management regime. However, there are many unanswered questions regarding the viability and sustainability of the new Pacific Salmon Treaty Agreement. This paper draws lessons from the recent period of turmoil to identify strengths and weaknesses in the new abundance-based management approach, and to suggest avenues for further negotiations to secure more rational management of Pacific salmon resources. Title: Climate, Uncertainty and the Pacific Salmon Treaty: Insights on the Harvest Management Game Author: Munro, Gordon, Tyedmers, Peter, McKelvey, Robert, Miller, Kathleen Year: 2001 Pacific Salmon are anadromous fish that cross state and international boundaries in their oceanic migrations. Fish spawned in the rivers of one jurisdiction are vulnerable to harvest in other jurisdictions. The rocky history of attempts by the United States and Canada to cooperatively manage their respective salmon harvests suggests that environmental variability may complicate the management of such shared resources. In recent years, an extended breakdown in cooperation was fueled by strongly divergent trends in Alaskan and southern salmon abundance, and a consequent change in the balance of each nation s interceptions of salmon spawned in the other nation s rivers. While several natural and anthropogenic factors contributed to these trends, there is considerable evidence that changing ocean conditions played a significant role. The period of high productivity in Alaska contributed to increased Alaskan interceptions of B.C. salmon at a time when Pacific Northwest coho and chinook could least withstand retaliatory actions on the part of the Canadian fleet. Only recently, has the mounting crisis led to a fundamental shift in the approach taken by the two nations to determine their respective salmon-harvest shares. On June 30, 1999, Canada and the U.S. signed an agreement which, if successfully implemented, may lay the groundwork for a more sustainable cooperative management regime. However, there are many unanswered questions regarding the viability and sustainability of the new Pacific Salmon Treaty Agreement. This paper draws lessons from the recent period of turmoil to identify strengths and weaknesses in the new abundance-based management approach, and to suggest avenues for further negotiations to secure more rational management of Pacific salmon resources. Close

• 12. [Article] Ludwig's Ratchet and the Collapse of New England Groundfish Stocks: Extended Abstract

  See the following for the published paper: T. Hennessey and M. Healey. 2000. Ludwig's ratchet and the collapse of New England groundfish stocks. Coastal Management 28:187-213

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Ludwig's Ratchet and the Collapse of New England Groundfish Stocks: Extended Abstract Author: Hennessey, Tim, Healey, Michael Year: 2001 See the following for the published paper: T. Hennessey and M. Healey. 2000. Ludwig's ratchet and the collapse of New England groundfish stocks. Coastal Management 28:187-213 Title: Ludwig's Ratchet and the Collapse of New England Groundfish Stocks: Extended Abstract Author: Hennessey, Tim, Healey, Michael Year: 2001 See the following for the published paper: T. Hennessey and M. Healey. 2000. Ludwig's ratchet and the collapse of New England groundfish stocks. Coastal Management 28:187-213 Close

• 13. [Article] Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries

  The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries Author: Matthiasson, Thorolfur Year: 2001 The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. Icelandic politicians have used much of their time and effort during the fourth quarter of the 20. century to debate how to organise the utilisation of the resource and in what way one should distribute the rents from its harvesting. In the paper give a short account of the development of the regulatory reforms in four types of Icelandic fisheries. No one of the reformatory processes can be said to be a replica of the any of the other processes. It seems evident at the face of things that each reformatory process is unique and distinct from the other except for the final outcome, the rule of the ITQs. But that may seem to be to short sighted conclusion. It should be evident from the earliest history of regulatory reforms that the ITQ system was not the intentional outcome. It came to be, eventually. There is a common pattern for all the fisheries, however. First of all: The serious attempts to reform the management practise starts first when the fishery has collapsed or is close to a collapse. Secondly, the first thing that stake holders seem to get done is to close the club that has access to the given fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules was used to allocate participation rights when the club of participants had been closed. Fourthly, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland prior to the invention of the ITQ system. Lastly, management of fisheries by ITQs rather than some form of taxes or fees may have historical rather than logical roots. Title: Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries Author: Matthiasson, Thorolfur Year: 2001 The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. Icelandic politicians have used much of their time and effort during the fourth quarter of the 20. century to debate how to organise the utilisation of the resource and in what way one should distribute the rents from its harvesting. In the paper give a short account of the development of the regulatory reforms in four types of Icelandic fisheries. No one of the reformatory processes can be said to be a replica of the any of the other processes. It seems evident at the face of things that each reformatory process is unique and distinct from the other except for the final outcome, the rule of the ITQs. But that may seem to be to short sighted conclusion. It should be evident from the earliest history of regulatory reforms that the ITQ system was not the intentional outcome. It came to be, eventually. There is a common pattern for all the fisheries, however. First of all: The serious attempts to reform the management practise starts first when the fishery has collapsed or is close to a collapse. Secondly, the first thing that stake holders seem to get done is to close the club that has access to the given fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules was used to allocate participation rights when the club of participants had been closed. Fourthly, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland prior to the invention of the ITQ system. Lastly, management of fisheries by ITQs rather than some form of taxes or fees may have historical rather than logical roots. Close