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• 71. [Article] The Potential for Insurance to Mediate Economic Risks in Marine Fisheries

  In agriculture there has been a long history of using a levy or an insurance premium to create mutual funds to mediate economic risks to growers due to environmental variability and quarantine pests. In ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Potential for Insurance to Mediate Economic Risks in Marine Fisheries Author: Levontin, Polina, Leach, Adrian, Kell, Laurence, Mumford, John In agriculture there has been a long history of using a levy or an insurance premium to create mutual funds to mediate economic risks to growers due to environmental variability and quarantine pests. In the United States the federal government, through the USDA, continues to underwrite funds (collected by private insurance agents) which are used to protect contributors from the effects of extreme weather and pest and disease losses. In Europe mutual funds such as the Kartoffelafgiftsfonden in Denmark and Potatopol in the Netherlands have been developed to mediate risks from some potato diseases in different ways. This paper uses established methods of economic risk management from agriculture and applies these to marine fisheries to demonstrate how financial risks could be mediated by the creation of insurance funds. Through the use of probabilistic estimates of future catches and prices, and the risk of depletion across various scenarios, we investigate how government and industry participation in creating and managing funds may encourage increased protection of fisheries, and compliance and enforcement for fishery regulations. The paper also explores how fund exposure may be reduced by the application of reinsurance from commercial insurers for the upper tail of high cost, low probability events, such as total fishery collapse. Title: The Potential for Insurance to Mediate Economic Risks in Marine Fisheries Author: Levontin, Polina, Leach, Adrian, Kell, Laurence, Mumford, John In agriculture there has been a long history of using a levy or an insurance premium to create mutual funds to mediate economic risks to growers due to environmental variability and quarantine pests. In the United States the federal government, through the USDA, continues to underwrite funds (collected by private insurance agents) which are used to protect contributors from the effects of extreme weather and pest and disease losses. In Europe mutual funds such as the Kartoffelafgiftsfonden in Denmark and Potatopol in the Netherlands have been developed to mediate risks from some potato diseases in different ways. This paper uses established methods of economic risk management from agriculture and applies these to marine fisheries to demonstrate how financial risks could be mediated by the creation of insurance funds. Through the use of probabilistic estimates of future catches and prices, and the risk of depletion across various scenarios, we investigate how government and industry participation in creating and managing funds may encourage increased protection of fisheries, and compliance and enforcement for fishery regulations. The paper also explores how fund exposure may be reduced by the application of reinsurance from commercial insurers for the upper tail of high cost, low probability events, such as total fishery collapse. Close

• 72. [Article] Ludwig's Ratchet and the Collapse of New England Groundfish Stocks: Extended Abstract

  See the following for the published paper: T. Hennessey and M. Healey. 2000. Ludwig's ratchet and the collapse of New England groundfish stocks. Coastal Management 28:187-213

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Ludwig's Ratchet and the Collapse of New England Groundfish Stocks: Extended Abstract Author: Hennessey, Tim, Healey, Michael Year: 2001 See the following for the published paper: T. Hennessey and M. Healey. 2000. Ludwig's ratchet and the collapse of New England groundfish stocks. Coastal Management 28:187-213 Title: Ludwig's Ratchet and the Collapse of New England Groundfish Stocks: Extended Abstract Author: Hennessey, Tim, Healey, Michael Year: 2001 See the following for the published paper: T. Hennessey and M. Healey. 2000. Ludwig's ratchet and the collapse of New England groundfish stocks. Coastal Management 28:187-213 Close

• 73. [Article] Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries

  The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries Author: Matthiasson, Thorolfur Year: 2001 The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. Icelandic politicians have used much of their time and effort during the fourth quarter of the 20. century to debate how to organise the utilisation of the resource and in what way one should distribute the rents from its harvesting. In the paper give a short account of the development of the regulatory reforms in four types of Icelandic fisheries. No one of the reformatory processes can be said to be a replica of the any of the other processes. It seems evident at the face of things that each reformatory process is unique and distinct from the other except for the final outcome, the rule of the ITQs. But that may seem to be to short sighted conclusion. It should be evident from the earliest history of regulatory reforms that the ITQ system was not the intentional outcome. It came to be, eventually. There is a common pattern for all the fisheries, however. First of all: The serious attempts to reform the management practise starts first when the fishery has collapsed or is close to a collapse. Secondly, the first thing that stake holders seem to get done is to close the club that has access to the given fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules was used to allocate participation rights when the club of participants had been closed. Fourthly, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland prior to the invention of the ITQ system. Lastly, management of fisheries by ITQs rather than some form of taxes or fees may have historical rather than logical roots. Title: Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries Author: Matthiasson, Thorolfur Year: 2001 The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. Icelandic politicians have used much of their time and effort during the fourth quarter of the 20. century to debate how to organise the utilisation of the resource and in what way one should distribute the rents from its harvesting. In the paper give a short account of the development of the regulatory reforms in four types of Icelandic fisheries. No one of the reformatory processes can be said to be a replica of the any of the other processes. It seems evident at the face of things that each reformatory process is unique and distinct from the other except for the final outcome, the rule of the ITQs. But that may seem to be to short sighted conclusion. It should be evident from the earliest history of regulatory reforms that the ITQ system was not the intentional outcome. It came to be, eventually. There is a common pattern for all the fisheries, however. First of all: The serious attempts to reform the management practise starts first when the fishery has collapsed or is close to a collapse. Secondly, the first thing that stake holders seem to get done is to close the club that has access to the given fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules was used to allocate participation rights when the club of participants had been closed. Fourthly, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland prior to the invention of the ITQ system. Lastly, management of fisheries by ITQs rather than some form of taxes or fees may have historical rather than logical roots. Close

• 74. [Article] South Australia’s Marine Park Catch/Effort Reduction Program – Implications for Fisheries Management

  presentation

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: South Australia’s Marine Park Catch/Effort Reduction Program – Implications for Fisheries Management Author: Sloan, Sean, Burnell, Andrew, Edwards, Roger, Doroudi, Mehdi presentation Title: South Australia’s Marine Park Catch/Effort Reduction Program – Implications for Fisheries Management Author: Sloan, Sean, Burnell, Andrew, Edwards, Roger, Doroudi, Mehdi presentation Close

• 75. [Article] From Fishing Capacity to Diversity: Changing Fishery Management Priorities in the New England Groundfish Fishery

  Research paper and Powerpoint Presentation

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: From Fishing Capacity to Diversity: Changing Fishery Management Priorities in the New England Groundfish Fishery Author: Thunberg, Eric, Correia, Steven Research paper and Powerpoint Presentation Title: From Fishing Capacity to Diversity: Changing Fishery Management Priorities in the New England Groundfish Fishery Author: Thunberg, Eric, Correia, Steven Research paper and Powerpoint Presentation Close

• 76. [Article] From Fishing Capacity to Diversity; Changing Fishery Management Priorities in the US New England Groundfish Fishery

  presentation

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: From Fishing Capacity to Diversity; Changing Fishery Management Priorities in the US New England Groundfish Fishery Author: Thunberg, Eric presentation Title: From Fishing Capacity to Diversity; Changing Fishery Management Priorities in the US New England Groundfish Fishery Author: Thunberg, Eric presentation Close

• 77. [Article] A Study on the Efficiency Mechanism of Pooling System and Social Capital in Fishery

  Self-management has been recognized as important in successfully governing the common pool resources. This is no exception in fishery. Fishery cooperatives, where fishermen collectively manage the fishery, ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: A Study on the Efficiency Mechanism of Pooling System and Social Capital in Fishery Author: Tegawa, Mihoko Self-management has been recognized as important in successfully governing the common pool resources. This is no exception in fishery. Fishery cooperatives, where fishermen collectively manage the fishery, are garnering much attention from both regulators and academics. In this study, we aim to empirically disentangle the efficiency mechanism of pooling system. The pooling system is a management rule that self-governing fishery can implement. Under the system a group of harvesters share catch and/or profits among members. Employment of the pooling system is a collective action that a group of harvesters takes. The pooling system can induce fishers different incentives ranging from free-riding on other’s fishing effort to strengthening effort coordination such as rotation of fishing grounds and joint marketing. This research hypothesizes two factors potentially affecting these different incentives: social capital and cooperative fishing practice. Social capital refers to attributes such as trust, reciprocity and cooperation in a human relationship that is important in economic welfare. Cooperative fishing practice is often employed under the pooling system because the system can make self interests align with group interests. We collected the data from fishery cooperatives in Japan, which have a long history of self-management as well as ample cases of the pooling system. In addition to surveys with fishery cooperatives staffs and fishermen, economic experiments are used to quantify social capital. Title: A Study on the Efficiency Mechanism of Pooling System and Social Capital in Fishery Author: Tegawa, Mihoko Self-management has been recognized as important in successfully governing the common pool resources. This is no exception in fishery. Fishery cooperatives, where fishermen collectively manage the fishery, are garnering much attention from both regulators and academics. In this study, we aim to empirically disentangle the efficiency mechanism of pooling system. The pooling system is a management rule that self-governing fishery can implement. Under the system a group of harvesters share catch and/or profits among members. Employment of the pooling system is a collective action that a group of harvesters takes. The pooling system can induce fishers different incentives ranging from free-riding on other’s fishing effort to strengthening effort coordination such as rotation of fishing grounds and joint marketing. This research hypothesizes two factors potentially affecting these different incentives: social capital and cooperative fishing practice. Social capital refers to attributes such as trust, reciprocity and cooperation in a human relationship that is important in economic welfare. Cooperative fishing practice is often employed under the pooling system because the system can make self interests align with group interests. We collected the data from fishery cooperatives in Japan, which have a long history of self-management as well as ample cases of the pooling system. In addition to surveys with fishery cooperatives staffs and fishermen, economic experiments are used to quantify social capital. Close

• 78. [Article] Understanding Non-Compliance Behavior with U.S. Protected Species Regulations

  Abstract Only

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Understanding Non-Compliance Behavior with U.S. Protected Species Regulations Author: Das, Chhandita, Bisack, Kathryn Abstract Only Title: Understanding Non-Compliance Behavior with U.S. Protected Species Regulations Author: Das, Chhandita, Bisack, Kathryn Abstract Only Close