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• 1. [Article] Fisheries Management and Rule of Law

  Fishing is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the U.S. economy. Theoretically, regulating an industry means subjecting it to the rule of law: treating those with an interest in the resource ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Fisheries Management and Rule of Law Author: McEvoy, Arthur F. Year: 2001 Fishing is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the U.S. economy. Theoretically, regulating an industry means subjecting it to the rule of law: treating those with an interest in the resource fairly while preserving the public interest in public order, economic efficiency, and conservation. There are, however, two opposing concepts of “rule of law,” each with deep roots in U.S. legal culture, that conflict with each other and frequently stymie efforts to regulate fisheries successfully. One of these concepts is the classical liberal idea of autonomy, which stresses the individual’s right to pursue his/her self-interest free of state interference. Rule of law here means that the state should guarantee private ordering, treat everyone alike, and promote private enterprise. The other is the Jeffersonian, or republican, idea of participation, which stresses the equal participation of all citizens in self-government. Throughout U.S. history, these two norms have co-existed uncomfortably with each other as sources of legitimacy for regulatory regimes. Liberal thinking predominated in the nineteenth century, although it clearly underlies limited-entry and other property-oriented regimes today. Republican thinking has emerged more recently in co-management regimes that stress the participation of user groups in data-gathering, policymaking, and enforcement. Somewhere in between is the New Deal style of governance, on which the Magnuson Act of 1976 is based. Title: Fisheries Management and Rule of Law Author: McEvoy, Arthur F. Year: 2001 Fishing is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the U.S. economy. Theoretically, regulating an industry means subjecting it to the rule of law: treating those with an interest in the resource fairly while preserving the public interest in public order, economic efficiency, and conservation. There are, however, two opposing concepts of “rule of law,” each with deep roots in U.S. legal culture, that conflict with each other and frequently stymie efforts to regulate fisheries successfully. One of these concepts is the classical liberal idea of autonomy, which stresses the individual’s right to pursue his/her self-interest free of state interference. Rule of law here means that the state should guarantee private ordering, treat everyone alike, and promote private enterprise. The other is the Jeffersonian, or republican, idea of participation, which stresses the equal participation of all citizens in self-government. Throughout U.S. history, these two norms have co-existed uncomfortably with each other as sources of legitimacy for regulatory regimes. Liberal thinking predominated in the nineteenth century, although it clearly underlies limited-entry and other property-oriented regimes today. Republican thinking has emerged more recently in co-management regimes that stress the participation of user groups in data-gathering, policymaking, and enforcement. Somewhere in between is the New Deal style of governance, on which the Magnuson Act of 1976 is based. Close

• 2. [Article] Institutional Evolution at Lake Chad: Traditional Administration and Flexible Fisheries Management

  Lake Chad is a vitally important wetland in the semi-arid Sahel corridor. It provides the basis of many thousands of livelihoods which depend on its seasonal fluctuations to renew fish stocks, farmland ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Institutional Evolution at Lake Chad: Traditional Administration and Flexible Fisheries Management Author: Sarch, Marie-Therese Year: 2001 Lake Chad is a vitally important wetland in the semi-arid Sahel corridor. It provides the basis of many thousands of livelihoods which depend on its seasonal fluctuations to renew fish stocks, farmland and rangeland. This paper describes how the institutions which govern access to fishing rights has evolved on the Nigerian shore of the lake. The paper aims to assess the applicability of different institutional approaches to fisheries management on the lake’s floodplain. These include: the ‘equilibrium or tragedy’ approach characterized by Hardin (1968); critiques of state attempts at regulating natural resources exploitation in the Sahel; models of institutional adaptation to resource scarcity; and approaches which perceive institutions for resource access as a crucial determinant of social and economic development. The western shore of Lake Chad has been under the jurisdiction of Borno State in its various guises since the end of the fourteenth century and is currently one of 36 states in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Although the administrative status of Borno has varied, it has been dominated by a Kanuri aristocracy for most of its existence. Traditionally, the Kanuri administration has played a crucial role in allocating access to farm land. In recent years, the ‘Kanuri administration’ has not only maintained its pre-colonial authority over farming on the lake shore, but has expanded it to cover new areas of the lake floor and the increasingly lucrative fishing opportunities which federal government has been unable to regulate. This success suggests that collaboration with the traditional administration is essential to the success of future natural resource management efforts. Title: Institutional Evolution at Lake Chad: Traditional Administration and Flexible Fisheries Management Author: Sarch, Marie-Therese Year: 2001 Lake Chad is a vitally important wetland in the semi-arid Sahel corridor. It provides the basis of many thousands of livelihoods which depend on its seasonal fluctuations to renew fish stocks, farmland and rangeland. This paper describes how the institutions which govern access to fishing rights has evolved on the Nigerian shore of the lake. The paper aims to assess the applicability of different institutional approaches to fisheries management on the lake’s floodplain. These include: the ‘equilibrium or tragedy’ approach characterized by Hardin (1968); critiques of state attempts at regulating natural resources exploitation in the Sahel; models of institutional adaptation to resource scarcity; and approaches which perceive institutions for resource access as a crucial determinant of social and economic development. The western shore of Lake Chad has been under the jurisdiction of Borno State in its various guises since the end of the fourteenth century and is currently one of 36 states in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Although the administrative status of Borno has varied, it has been dominated by a Kanuri aristocracy for most of its existence. Traditionally, the Kanuri administration has played a crucial role in allocating access to farm land. In recent years, the ‘Kanuri administration’ has not only maintained its pre-colonial authority over farming on the lake shore, but has expanded it to cover new areas of the lake floor and the increasingly lucrative fishing opportunities which federal government has been unable to regulate. This success suggests that collaboration with the traditional administration is essential to the success of future natural resource management efforts. Close

• 3. [Article] On Demand-side Approaches to Solving the "Tragedy of High Prices" in Fisheries

  While overfishing frequently is explained in terms of «the Tragedy of the Commons» model, it is argued that the economic causes of such long-run resource problems could be more accurately characterised ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: On Demand-side Approaches to Solving the "Tragedy of High Prices" in Fisheries Author: Valatin, Gregory Year: 2001 While overfishing frequently is explained in terms of «the Tragedy of the Commons» model, it is argued that the economic causes of such long-run resource problems could be more accurately characterised in terms of a «Tragedy of High Prices» due to landings prices exceeding fishing costs at the socially optimal level of resource use. In tackling over-exploitation problems, the feasibility and relative efficiency of demand-side measures in attaining management objectives without necessitating introduction of other fishing rights is discussed. Distributional issues associated with using a market mechanism to allocate use rights and potential adoption of demand-side measures within a co-management framework are considered. Despite apparently desirable properties, solutions based upon demand-side regulation have been much neglected in the literature, and rarely put into practice. Discussion of such systems provides a contribution towards the continuing debate regarding how best to improve fisheries management, to ensure that economic rents are neither purely dissipated, nor simply captured by a first generation of resource users. Title: On Demand-side Approaches to Solving the "Tragedy of High Prices" in Fisheries Author: Valatin, Gregory Year: 2001 While overfishing frequently is explained in terms of «the Tragedy of the Commons» model, it is argued that the economic causes of such long-run resource problems could be more accurately characterised in terms of a «Tragedy of High Prices» due to landings prices exceeding fishing costs at the socially optimal level of resource use. In tackling over-exploitation problems, the feasibility and relative efficiency of demand-side measures in attaining management objectives without necessitating introduction of other fishing rights is discussed. Distributional issues associated with using a market mechanism to allocate use rights and potential adoption of demand-side measures within a co-management framework are considered. Despite apparently desirable properties, solutions based upon demand-side regulation have been much neglected in the literature, and rarely put into practice. Discussion of such systems provides a contribution towards the continuing debate regarding how best to improve fisheries management, to ensure that economic rents are neither purely dissipated, nor simply captured by a first generation of resource users. Close