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• 1. [Article] The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study

  Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study Author: Thebaud, Olivier Year: 2001 Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. The discussion of management measures implicitly assumes that an external intervention will be possible - usually by the State - either to regulate directly resource use, or to allocate and enforce private use rights in order for decentralised co-ordination systems to operate efficiently. At first sight, economic models developed to explain fisheries over-exploitation leave little hope for selfregulation to emerge from a competitive fishery. The paper focuses on the analytical issues underlying the on-going debate on the possibility for fisheries to be self-regulated. Based on the analysis of a historical case study - the development of management arrangements between whaling firms in the 1930ies and 1950-60ies - it shows that the absence of a central authority cannot be systematically associated to an absence of regulation, and explores some of the implications this has for the economic analysis of fisheries management. Title: The Economics of Fisheries Self-regulation: Analytical Issues and a Historical Case Study Author: Thebaud, Olivier Year: 2001 Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. The discussion of management measures implicitly assumes that an external intervention will be possible - usually by the State - either to regulate directly resource use, or to allocate and enforce private use rights in order for decentralised co-ordination systems to operate efficiently. At first sight, economic models developed to explain fisheries over-exploitation leave little hope for selfregulation to emerge from a competitive fishery. The paper focuses on the analytical issues underlying the on-going debate on the possibility for fisheries to be self-regulated. Based on the analysis of a historical case study - the development of management arrangements between whaling firms in the 1930ies and 1950-60ies - it shows that the absence of a central authority cannot be systematically associated to an absence of regulation, and explores some of the implications this has for the economic analysis of fisheries management. Close

• 2. [Article] ITQs and Property Rights: A review of Australian case law

  This paper discusses the legal concepts of property and property rights and examines how the Australian courts perceive fishing entitlements (licences, ITQs and Individual Effort Units). On the basis of ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: ITQs and Property Rights: A review of Australian case law Author: Kaufmann, Barry, Sen, Sevaly, Geen, Gerry Year: 2001 This paper discusses the legal concepts of property and property rights and examines how the Australian courts perceive fishing entitlements (licences, ITQs and Individual Effort Units). On the basis of case law concerning the nature of other fishing entitlements, such as fishing licences, the courts are likely to find that ITQs are proprietary in nature. However the Australian courts have found that fishing entitlements, although similar in terms of the privileges conferred, are not the common law property right of profit á prendre. They are a statutory entitlement. Compensation for modification and extinguishment of these rights depends on whether there is compensation payable under applicable legislation or on whether the plaintiffs can rely on constitutional guarantees of acquisition of property on just terms. The courts have clearly indicated that fishing entitlements are rights created by government as means of regulating the fishing industry and are thus governed by the legislation that created them. By annulling that legislation, the entitlement no longer exists. By modifying the legislation, the entitlement is redefined. However, until there is a relevant Australian case on ITQs, it remains to be seen whether the courts will view them any differently to other fishing entitlements Title: ITQs and Property Rights: A review of Australian case law Author: Kaufmann, Barry, Sen, Sevaly, Geen, Gerry Year: 2001 This paper discusses the legal concepts of property and property rights and examines how the Australian courts perceive fishing entitlements (licences, ITQs and Individual Effort Units). On the basis of case law concerning the nature of other fishing entitlements, such as fishing licences, the courts are likely to find that ITQs are proprietary in nature. However the Australian courts have found that fishing entitlements, although similar in terms of the privileges conferred, are not the common law property right of profit á prendre. They are a statutory entitlement. Compensation for modification and extinguishment of these rights depends on whether there is compensation payable under applicable legislation or on whether the plaintiffs can rely on constitutional guarantees of acquisition of property on just terms. The courts have clearly indicated that fishing entitlements are rights created by government as means of regulating the fishing industry and are thus governed by the legislation that created them. By annulling that legislation, the entitlement no longer exists. By modifying the legislation, the entitlement is redefined. However, until there is a relevant Australian case on ITQs, it remains to be seen whether the courts will view them any differently to other fishing entitlements Close

• 3. [Article] Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries

  The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries Author: Matthiasson, Thorolfur Year: 2001 The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. Icelandic politicians have used much of their time and effort during the fourth quarter of the 20. century to debate how to organise the utilisation of the resource and in what way one should distribute the rents from its harvesting. In the paper give a short account of the development of the regulatory reforms in four types of Icelandic fisheries. No one of the reformatory processes can be said to be a replica of the any of the other processes. It seems evident at the face of things that each reformatory process is unique and distinct from the other except for the final outcome, the rule of the ITQs. But that may seem to be to short sighted conclusion. It should be evident from the earliest history of regulatory reforms that the ITQ system was not the intentional outcome. It came to be, eventually. There is a common pattern for all the fisheries, however. First of all: The serious attempts to reform the management practise starts first when the fishery has collapsed or is close to a collapse. Secondly, the first thing that stake holders seem to get done is to close the club that has access to the given fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules was used to allocate participation rights when the club of participants had been closed. Fourthly, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland prior to the invention of the ITQ system. Lastly, management of fisheries by ITQs rather than some form of taxes or fees may have historical rather than logical roots. Title: Changing Rules for Regulation of Icelandic Fisheries Author: Matthiasson, Thorolfur Year: 2001 The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. Icelandic politicians have used much of their time and effort during the fourth quarter of the 20. century to debate how to organise the utilisation of the resource and in what way one should distribute the rents from its harvesting. In the paper give a short account of the development of the regulatory reforms in four types of Icelandic fisheries. No one of the reformatory processes can be said to be a replica of the any of the other processes. It seems evident at the face of things that each reformatory process is unique and distinct from the other except for the final outcome, the rule of the ITQs. But that may seem to be to short sighted conclusion. It should be evident from the earliest history of regulatory reforms that the ITQ system was not the intentional outcome. It came to be, eventually. There is a common pattern for all the fisheries, however. First of all: The serious attempts to reform the management practise starts first when the fishery has collapsed or is close to a collapse. Secondly, the first thing that stake holders seem to get done is to close the club that has access to the given fishery. Thirdly, a variety of rules was used to allocate participation rights when the club of participants had been closed. Fourthly, prices were used to manage fisheries in Iceland prior to the invention of the ITQ system. Lastly, management of fisheries by ITQs rather than some form of taxes or fees may have historical rather than logical roots. Close