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• 1. [Article] Conservation for Sale: A Dynamic Common Agency Model of Natural Resource Regulation

  This paper considers the regulation of a natural resource within a dynamic common agency framework. In setting harvest quotas, the regulator responds to lobbying pressure (contributions) from harvesters ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Conservation for Sale: A Dynamic Common Agency Model of Natural Resource Regulation Author: Boyce, John R. Year: 2001 This paper considers the regulation of a natural resource within a dynamic common agency framework. In setting harvest quotas, the regulator responds to lobbying pressure (contributions) from harvesters and conservationists. The truthful Markov perfect equilibrium stock is then an increasing function of the effective political weight for conservationists. Since the contributions to the regulator are independent of the no-regulation equilibrium, both individual and aggregate welfare may decline by adopting regulation. Indeed, harvesters operating under private property will always oppose regulation, and harvesters operating under common property will oppose regulation if their welfare is not valued highly enough by the regulator. Since conservationists’ gross welfare is always improved by regulation, and since the regulator cannot fully capture their rents, conservationists will support regulation. For regulation to be supported by harvesters and conservationists, it is more important that the welfare of harvesters be taken into account by the regulator. This is because harvesters, like conservationists, value the stock, but conservationists, unlike harvesters, place no value on the harvests. Title: Conservation for Sale: A Dynamic Common Agency Model of Natural Resource Regulation Author: Boyce, John R. Year: 2001 This paper considers the regulation of a natural resource within a dynamic common agency framework. In setting harvest quotas, the regulator responds to lobbying pressure (contributions) from harvesters and conservationists. The truthful Markov perfect equilibrium stock is then an increasing function of the effective political weight for conservationists. Since the contributions to the regulator are independent of the no-regulation equilibrium, both individual and aggregate welfare may decline by adopting regulation. Indeed, harvesters operating under private property will always oppose regulation, and harvesters operating under common property will oppose regulation if their welfare is not valued highly enough by the regulator. Since conservationists’ gross welfare is always improved by regulation, and since the regulator cannot fully capture their rents, conservationists will support regulation. For regulation to be supported by harvesters and conservationists, it is more important that the welfare of harvesters be taken into account by the regulator. This is because harvesters, like conservationists, value the stock, but conservationists, unlike harvesters, place no value on the harvests. Close

• 2. [Article] Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish

  Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish Author: Poole, Erik Year: 2001 Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort is regulated and effort caps appear to be binding, I argue that social choice of political lobbying effort becomes the principal choice variable by which commercial fishermen continue to press for additional fishing opportunities relative to the regulator’s desired catch target. The model helps explain recent fish stock collapses. The analysis also questions the appropriateness of continuing the fishing category of Canadian employment insurance as the regulator embraces a precautionary, risk averse approach to fisheries management. Title: Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish Author: Poole, Erik Year: 2001 Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a regulated, restricted access common property fishery with income supplements. As variable fishing effort is regulated and effort caps appear to be binding, I argue that social choice of political lobbying effort becomes the principal choice variable by which commercial fishermen continue to press for additional fishing opportunities relative to the regulator’s desired catch target. The model helps explain recent fish stock collapses. The analysis also questions the appropriateness of continuing the fishing category of Canadian employment insurance as the regulator embraces a precautionary, risk averse approach to fisheries management. Close

• 3. [Article] Cleaning of Eutrophic Inland Waters for Fishery and Amenities: On the Treatment of Dynamic Aspects in Political Economy Modelling of Statutory Regulations in Polluting Communities

  Due to the immanent common property problem of water, non-point-pollution is the common feature of many inland waters and the eutrophic levels are alarmingly high. drinking water and other services are ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Cleaning of Eutrophic Inland Waters for Fishery and Amenities: On the Treatment of Dynamic Aspects in Political Economy Modelling of Statutory Regulations in Polluting Communities Author: Nuppenau, Ernst-August Year: 2001 Due to the immanent common property problem of water, non-point-pollution is the common feature of many inland waters and the eutrophic levels are alarmingly high. drinking water and other services are negatively affected by high eutrophic levels fisheries. Concerning causes of pollution, agriculture, subject to overuse of fertilizer and pesticides, is regarded as the main polluter. Environmental regulations on farm practices, such as animal waste and fertilizer application, seek to minimize shocks imposed by eutrophying substances. Since many waters already show high concentrations of these substances, even cleaning is needed. In the dynamic context of eutrophication, which results from multiple polluters and is accumulated over time, damage to water quality depends on stocks and flows of pollutants. The paper presents a model that counts for limitation of inflows and attributed levels of farm activity to pollution. The paper applies a combination of dynamic control and political economy models, optimized by a manager of a common property, a clean lake, a river or, more generally, an interconnected watershed. It seeks to achieve an agreed level of cleanness or eutrophic levels of water on behalf of a community. A political economy model depicts the bargaining process for the establishment of an objective function of the community. The manager is a partial manager, not a benevolent dictator, but has statutory power to regulate fertilizer application on lake shores and alleviate eutrophication with nutrients. Benefits are purified waters that benefit all members, including fishermen. As institutions, the approach investigates the tragedy of the commons and statutory regulations. Financial innovations for compensation are also possible. Title: Cleaning of Eutrophic Inland Waters for Fishery and Amenities: On the Treatment of Dynamic Aspects in Political Economy Modelling of Statutory Regulations in Polluting Communities Author: Nuppenau, Ernst-August Year: 2001 Due to the immanent common property problem of water, non-point-pollution is the common feature of many inland waters and the eutrophic levels are alarmingly high. drinking water and other services are negatively affected by high eutrophic levels fisheries. Concerning causes of pollution, agriculture, subject to overuse of fertilizer and pesticides, is regarded as the main polluter. Environmental regulations on farm practices, such as animal waste and fertilizer application, seek to minimize shocks imposed by eutrophying substances. Since many waters already show high concentrations of these substances, even cleaning is needed. In the dynamic context of eutrophication, which results from multiple polluters and is accumulated over time, damage to water quality depends on stocks and flows of pollutants. The paper presents a model that counts for limitation of inflows and attributed levels of farm activity to pollution. The paper applies a combination of dynamic control and political economy models, optimized by a manager of a common property, a clean lake, a river or, more generally, an interconnected watershed. It seeks to achieve an agreed level of cleanness or eutrophic levels of water on behalf of a community. A political economy model depicts the bargaining process for the establishment of an objective function of the community. The manager is a partial manager, not a benevolent dictator, but has statutory power to regulate fertilizer application on lake shores and alleviate eutrophication with nutrients. Benefits are purified waters that benefit all members, including fishermen. As institutions, the approach investigates the tragedy of the commons and statutory regulations. Financial innovations for compensation are also possible. Close