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• 1. [Article] Stability of International Fisheries Agreements: Implications of Non-Market Benefits and the Country of Origin

  Salmon is an anadromous species that during its feeding and spawning migrations is sought after catch for commercial and recreational fisheries. The management of salmon fisheries is complicated by the ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Stability of International Fisheries Agreements: Implications of Non-Market Benefits and the Country of Origin Author: Levontin, Polina, Kulmala, Soile, Laukkanen, Marita, Lindroos, Marko, Romakkaniemi, Atso, Nieminen, Emmi, Parkkila, Katja, Pintassilgo, Pedro, Pulkkinen, Henni Salmon is an anadromous species that during its feeding and spawning migrations is sought after catch for commercial and recreational fisheries. The management of salmon fisheries is complicated by the combination of mixed and single stock fisheries. Thus, the country of origin has sovereign control over harvest of a salmon stock only at the last steps of the gauntlet. This paper addresses the stability of an international fisheries agreement on the Baltic salmon. This setting is modeled through a coalition game in the partition function form with four asymmetric players. Countries payoffs depend both on commercial fishery’s profits and net benefits from recreational harvest. Moreover, the country of origin must ensure that each of the salmon stocks achieve or maintain a sustainable size. The economic sub-model is calibrated using commercial fisheries statistics and existing non-market valuation studies. The underlying population dynamics model accounts for 15 salmon stocks and it is used in the actual stock assessment. The results indicate that by considering economic aspects of recreational fisheries it is possible to stabilize the grand coalition. However, the cooperative strategies of the grand coalition do not ensure biologically sound harvesting of all salmon stocks. Title: Stability of International Fisheries Agreements: Implications of Non-Market Benefits and the Country of Origin Author: Levontin, Polina, Kulmala, Soile, Laukkanen, Marita, Lindroos, Marko, Romakkaniemi, Atso, Nieminen, Emmi, Parkkila, Katja, Pintassilgo, Pedro, Pulkkinen, Henni Salmon is an anadromous species that during its feeding and spawning migrations is sought after catch for commercial and recreational fisheries. The management of salmon fisheries is complicated by the combination of mixed and single stock fisheries. Thus, the country of origin has sovereign control over harvest of a salmon stock only at the last steps of the gauntlet. This paper addresses the stability of an international fisheries agreement on the Baltic salmon. This setting is modeled through a coalition game in the partition function form with four asymmetric players. Countries payoffs depend both on commercial fishery’s profits and net benefits from recreational harvest. Moreover, the country of origin must ensure that each of the salmon stocks achieve or maintain a sustainable size. The economic sub-model is calibrated using commercial fisheries statistics and existing non-market valuation studies. The underlying population dynamics model accounts for 15 salmon stocks and it is used in the actual stock assessment. The results indicate that by considering economic aspects of recreational fisheries it is possible to stabilize the grand coalition. However, the cooperative strategies of the grand coalition do not ensure biologically sound harvesting of all salmon stocks. Close

• 2. [Article] Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea - A Case of Trivial Cooperation

  This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in partition function form. The signs of economic and biological overexploitation of these salmon ...

  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea - A Case of Trivial Cooperation Author: Levontin, Polina, Kulmala, Soile, Lindroos, Marko, Pintassilgo, Pedro This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in partition function form. The signs of economic and biological overexploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), has been ostensible. Combining a twostage game of four asymmetric players with a disaggregated bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the present Relative Stability Principle (RSP) is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is full noncooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under specific sharing schemes. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort, without compromising stock sustainability. Title: Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea - A Case of Trivial Cooperation Author: Levontin, Polina, Kulmala, Soile, Lindroos, Marko, Pintassilgo, Pedro This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in partition function form. The signs of economic and biological overexploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), has been ostensible. Combining a twostage game of four asymmetric players with a disaggregated bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the present Relative Stability Principle (RSP) is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is full noncooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under specific sharing schemes. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort, without compromising stock sustainability. Close

• 3. [Article] Identifying Nash equilibrium strategies for a multi-fleet multi-national fishery under uncertainty

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  Citation × Citation Citation Abstract Copy Title: Identifying Nash equilibrium strategies for a multi-fleet multi-national fishery under uncertainty Author: Levontin, Polina, Kulmala, Soile Abstract Only Title: Identifying Nash equilibrium strategies for a multi-fleet multi-national fishery under uncertainty Author: Levontin, Polina, Kulmala, Soile Abstract Only Close